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GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY IN TORT, VI
EDWIN M. BORCHARD
HISTORY AND THEORY (Continued)
The State Subject to Law
When we turn to history for evidence of the cultural tradition
of the State and of its relation to law, we find the overwhelming
weight of authority opposed to the absolutistic view of sover-
eignty and of the State and denying the alleged independence
of both from the limitations embodied in the conception of law.
The meaning assigned to "law" is of course not always uniform.
It will be found that human society from the days of Plato to
those of Bodin was dominated by certain fundamental ideas
concerning the nature of man and of government, of the source
of authority and of the limited power of rulers. The Athenian
city-state, the Roman law and the Teutonic tradition all con-
tiibuted to strengthen the theory of popular control; and while
the influence of the Church for the most part nourished the
claims of divine right of dngs and thus aided absolutism, still
the prevailing doctrines and conceptions of justice, of the equal-
ity of men and of natural law as universal forces dominating all
political institutions, left of absolutism, sporadically advanced,
mainly a theory and a claim, and never a political fact.
The analytical jurist, not unaware of the fact that all human
authority or power is restricted I and that the psychological
force of two thousand years of political theory exerts a serious
limitation upon what his conceived sovereign law-making au-
thority may in practice do, contents himself with the assertion
'See Justice Holmes in The Western Maid, 257 U. S. 419, 432, 42 Sup.
Ct. 159, 161 (1922). "The sovereign does not create justice in an cthical
sense, to be sure, and there may be cases in which it would not dare to
deny that justice for fear of war or revolution. Sovereignty is a question
of power, and no human power is unlimited."
[1039 ]
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that the control thus exercised upon his theoretically unlimited
sovereign is moral and ethical in its nature, and not legal. His
concern is with form and method. His narrow definition of law
and his restricted vidw as to its source in legislative enactment
or tacit approval permit him to regard the State, the postulated
creator of the law, as indispensable to law and necessarily above
it and free from its control. That the problem is largely one of
definition is evidenced by the fact that he is uncertain whether
enunciation or declaration is sufficient to establish law, or
whether enforcement is necessary. 2
The historical as well as the sociological jurist, if those terms
may be permitted to describe schools of thought, approaches the
relation between State and law from different premises. His con-
cern is with substance and the content of rules of conduct. From
that point of view he sees law as an evolutionary process, ex-
isting in primitive society eons before the territorial State was
known. He sees the content of positive law in society fashioned
by the prevailing mores and by the postulates of that society, and
finds that western civilization has been nurtured under the con-
ceptions of justice, civil equality and natural law. He finds cur-
rent evidence of this fact in every modern governmental con-
stitution. He therefore concludes that positive law and the
modern State, its professed but unadmitted creator, is necessarily
bound by these soi-disant constitutional limitations, which it
dare not and does not transgress. To the limitations, moulded
by history and social phenomena, and sometimes translated into
written constitutions, he is willing to give the name of law, and
he concludes that the State and all its agents are necessarily
bound by law.
If we are to attempt to reconcile these two conceptions, we
find that their differences revolve around their point of view
and their varying definitions of the concept law. The task of the
analytical jurist is the easier, for he is concerned with the in-
tellectual process of segregating the conception of positive law
from other rules of human conduct and of explaining the form
and machinery of government. The sociological jurist seeks to
explain the behavior of society and its institutions, and for him
form is subordinated in importance to substance. It is possible
that the restricted objective of the analytical jurist leaves his
conclusion sterile, except within the narrowest limits, because
2 See WILLOUGHBY, FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF PUBLIC LAWv (1924) 138,
145 et seq., who differs from Austin by regarding enforcement as unneces-
sary. Willoughby, it may be inferred, would thus regard the Volstead Act
as law, even in certain eastern sections of the United States, where the
Act is manifestly not enforced; Austin presumably would not. On the
element of enforcement, see Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort
(1927) 36 YALE LAW JOURNAL 770, 780.
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incapable of throwing light on human relations or forecasting
evolutionary tendencies, and that in his professed discovery of
"sovereignty" he manifests the elemental instinct to seek a First
Cause behind the chain of human phenomena. Hence the ac-
cusation of scholars like Duguit that sovereignty and the State
are akin to theological and metaphysical conceptions, which,
though merely scientific hypotheses, have lived so long as to be
mistakenly regarded as scientific truths.3 Yet the analytical jurist
does furnish us with tools of precision for legal reasoning in the
form of an exact terminology. The sociological jurist, with a
wider objective, serves us in a different way by explaining our
social institutions. He at least claims that he is guided by scien-
tific method. in studying the data of observed phenomena and in
reaching his conclusions, not through a philosophy founded on
such an abstraction as sovereignty, but through the historical
stages of hypothesis, theory and scientific truth, tempered by
the admission that truth is relative and not absolute.! Inasmuch
as the anti-absolutist political theories which prevailed in Europe
throughout the Middle Ages and after the Reformation are
prominently identified in the judicial and legislative conception
of the responsible State, as expounded in the nineteenth cen-
tury, it will be of interest to take a cursory view of the historical
development of these theories in so far as they affect the State
in its relation to law or as controlled by moral and other limita-
tions. It is significant that one of the principal defenders of
the historical theory of the limited State, Gierke, is also the
spiritual father of the far-reaching German legislation, now
embodied in the Constitution, which finally made the State re-
sponsible for the torts committed by its agents in the perfor-
mance even of governmental functions.
POLITICAL THEORY
Ancient Civilization. Primitive political ideas have but little
to offer for the understanding of the modern State. The disting-
uishing feature of primitive society is the failure to differentiate
religion, custom and law. The bond of unity in the group was
religious and the authority behind group rules is the "will" of the
gods. Primitive law is made up mostly of taboos and no dis-
3 We have had occasion to observe the interesting analogy drawn by
Kelsen between the conceptions of God and the State. Borchard, op. cit.
supra note 2, at 771.
4 See the view of Proudhon: "All ideas of truth are fake, that is, con-
tradictory and irrational, if one attaches to them an exclusive and abso-
lute meaning; they are all verities, that is, susceptible of realization and
utility, if they are viewed in relation to others, or in evolution." LA
PHOSOPHM DU PROGRES (1868) 22. The absolute character of Eovereignty
and of the State in the Austinian conception encounters this very danger.
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tinction between law and morals is conceived. From the
standpoint of behaviorism, perhaps the modern emphasis on this
distinction is too often artificial.
So in oriental empires. Notwithstanding a highly developed
social organization, the identification of family, church, state and
industry prevented the development of a systematic political
philosophy. Tradition and dogma were the postulates of society;
individualism, seemingly necessary to political theory, was un-
known to oriental paternalism. Moral and religious codes, un-
changeable by human agencies, handed down from early times
and assumed to have divine inspiration, embody the community
conception of law. Thus again, law, morals, custom, religion,
are more or less interchangeable terms. The worship of common
gods constitutes the bond of unity. The State, vaguely realized,
and its human governors, king, aristocracy or oligarchy, are not
law-makers; but on the contrary, all human members of the State,
rulers and ruled, are bound by the codes and traditions which are
the common heritage of all. 6
The Hindu political philosophy is apparently based on the con-
ception that man is essentially wicked and selfish, that the state
of nature is one of violence, injustice and the rule of might, and
that authority, law and punishment were necessary to prevent
these evils. Thus the State arose, a conception entertained by
the church fathers as well as by Hobbes and the forerunners of
the modern conception of sovereignty. But whereas Hobbes
made his sovereign irresponsible, Hindu political thought, which
personified authority in the ruler, subjected him to restraint and
punishment. Resistance to arbitrariness was openly advocated.-
In India, we find early support for the limited monarchy, for
popular and democratic institutions, for the ideal of the natural
5 FUSTEL DE COULANGES, THE ANCIENT CITY, trans. by W. Small (11th
ed. 1901) bk. 1, 3, particularly c. 11; TOZZER, SOCIAL ORIGINS AND SOCIAL
CONTINUITIES (1925) c. 6; GETTELL, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT (1924)
c. 1; KOCOUREK and WIGMORE, SOURCES OF ANCIENT AND PRIMITIVE LAW
(1915) pt. 1 and 3; ibid. PRIMITIVE AND ANCIENT LEGAL INSTITUTIONS
(1915) c. 5; HARTLAND, PRIMITIVE LAW (1924) c. 1, 2, 6, 8; MAINE,
EARLY LAW AND CUSTOMS (1891) c. 2, 7; ibid. ANCIENT LAW (5th ed.
1873) c. 5; ibid. EARLY HISTORY OF INSTITUTIONS (1875) Lectures 11,
12, 13; BRYCE, STUDIES IN HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE (1901) Essay 13.
SUMNER, FOLKWAYs (1911) c. 1, 15; WILLOUGHBY, POLITICAL THEORIES
OF THE ANCIENT WORLD (1903) c. 1; ibid. op. cit. supra note 2, c. 11.
6 BREASTED, DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGION AND THOUGHT IN ANCIENT EGYPT
(1912) Lectures 1, 7, 9; GmTELL, op. cit. supra note 5, c. 1; GUMPLOWICZ,
1 GESCHICHTE DER STAATSTHEORIEN (1905), §§ 1-4; BEROLZHEIMER, THE
WORLD'S LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES (1912). c. 1; JOHNS, BABYLONIAN AND As-
SYRIAN LAWS, CONTRACTS AND LETTERS (1904) c. 5-7; WILLOUGHBY, op. Cit.
supra note 5, c. 2; POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY (1923) c. 1, 2.
7 Sarkar, Hindu Political Philosophy (1918) 33 POL. ScI. Q. 482, 488,
495, 498.
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equality of man and human brotherhood, ideas which have ex-
erted so great an influence in modern times.8 In Chinese
philosophy also, we find the doctrine that law is necessary to re-
strain the innate depravity of man. The people's aspirations
reflect the will of Heaven and popular consent was deemed inher-
ent in government. It was a public duty to depose a wrong-doing
king an idea which found admiration in eighteenth century
France.
The ancient Hebrews also entertained a theocratic conception
of the State. Though political authority, like law, was deemed
divine in origin, and sanction was derived from the will of the
single God, Jehovah, and was therefore absolute, permanent and
binding on rulers and subjects alike, nevertheless the idea of
popular and voluntary consent to these laws was also prominent
in Hebrew political philosophy. The kings were not only subject
to the general law, but were subject to criticism and to the deci-
sion of the priests interpreting the law. Codification of the law
and secular courts were adopted as a further means of con-
trol.' ,
To the ancient world, therefore, the modern conceptions of the
State and sovereignty are unknown. Law, however, embodying
rules of conduct having a social sanction, is raised to a place of
preeminence in the community. As among all ancient civiliza-
tions, the alternative to anarchy is not the State, but law.."
The identification of law with morals and religion baffles and
disturbs the modern analytical jurist. Law was found in custom
and tradition, and controlled all human governors, kings, oli-
garchies, nobles. Popular consent as an ingredient in govern-
ment seems to have been a common notion. Family and group-
life were highly integrated, and the law was administered largely
through family or group agents. It is, of course, analytically
possible to conceive of these local units of self-government as
states, as is more readily apparent in the city-states of early
Greece. Absolutism and deliberate legislation are strangely
8 Sarkar, Democratic Ideals and Republican Iuntitutions in India (1913)
12 AI. PoL. ScI. REv. 581; ibid. Theory of Property, Law and Social O0dcr
in Hindu Political Philosophy (1920) 30 INTERNATIONAL JOLMNAL OF
ETHICS, 311; ibid. Hindu Theory of the State (1921) 3G POL. SCI. Q. 9.
0 GETTLL, op. cit. supra note 5, at 29; Kuo, Vo chincsischcu Rcchts-znd
Staatstheorien (1922) 40 ZTSCHL F. VERGL. RECHTswxsSENScILr, 135;
SuzuKI, A BRIEF HISTORY OF ANCIENT CHINESE PHILOSOPHY (1914); Port,
CHINESE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (1925) c. 4.
10 GaTTELL, op. cit. supra note 5, at 30; KENT, ISREL'S L.AWS AND LEFGAL
PRECEDENTS (1907) 8 et seq.; 1 mICHAELIS, CozvsTENTAnIEs ON THE LAW73
OF MOSES (1814) bk. 1.
111 AINE, op. cit. s2pra, note 5, Lecture 13; Jenhsq, Sources of the Law
(1924) 50 LAW JoURNAL, 666.
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absent from these conceptions.12 The State is a vague and
rudimentary abstraction. It is for these reasons that Sir Henry
Maine finds the Austinian view of the source of positive law in
the State unacceptable, for he concludes that law is to be found
in the most primitive forms of social life, does not depend on the
State '3 and prevails among nomadic tribes with and without
definite chiefs, like the Eskimos. The Hobbesian conception of
sovereignty is utterly inapplicable to ancient society.
Greece. Greek political thought first developed a clear distinc-
tion between law and religion, and between morals and law. This
was due in part to the realization that the individual was a factor
in society, and though in the Spartan, as in the modern Hegelian
and Fascist conception, the individual was absorbed in the State,
the Sophists emphasized the importance of the individual in his
relation to the group and thus laid the foundation for political
theory and public law. The Greeks also developed the city-state,
and through Aristotle conveyed to the modern world practical
ideas of governmental arrangements which still prevail.
Perhaps the greatest contribution of the Greeks to political
thought is the substitution of reason for superstition and the sub-
ordination of religious to social and psychological explanations of
government, law and the State. Nature and the universe were
deemed susceptible of rational interpretation. The State was the
product of nature, and man was, by nature, a political and "social
animal." Law was not the creation of any legislative organ.
The later Greeks believed that law (or right) was to be found,
as a complete system, in reason itself, an embryo of the nine-
teenth century French conception of the sovereignty of reason.1 4
12 Legislation has been the last stage and possibly the least important in
the growth of law. See Pound, Legislation as a Social Function (1912) 7
PROCEEDINGS OF AmERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY, 148, 155. Nor was force
regarded as a sanction of the law in early society. It is for these reasons
that sovereignty in the sense of Hobbes and Austin could not be conceived
in ancient times. That conception is only possible in the territorial State
of the west, yet Hobbes and Austin seem to have regarded it as of uni-
versal application. This seems to have no historical justification.
13 MAINE, INSTITUTIONS, Lecture 13; WILOUGHBY, Op. Cit. supra
note 2, at 134. Maine shows that even at the present time in India and
other Asiatic countries, the Austinian law-making authority does not exist.
Cf. the creation of law in a mining camp. COSTIGAN, AMERICAN MINING
LAw (1908) § 2.
14 MERRIAM, HISTORY OF SOVEREIGNTY (1900) C. 5. In the early nineteenth
century, after the restoration of Louis XVIII in France, it was difficult
to locate sovereignty, as the source of power. Then arose the school which
maintained the sovereignty of reason, not unlike the modern school which
insists on the sovereignty of law. That school, whose ablest exponent was
Cousin (CoURS D'HISTOIRE DE LA PHILOSOPHIE MORALE AU 180 SIECLE [1839])
maintained that sovereignty is the same as absolute right. Whence comes
that? Three theories have been defended, says Cousin, namely, force, will
and reason. Rejecting force and will as a test of right, he selects reason-
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The State applied, but did not create, law. Yet Greece went
through various stages, from theocracy to aristocracy, through
tyranny to democracy. Homer, indeed, portrayed a theocratic
organization of the State, in which custom and tradition
governed, law and religion were one, and the will of the Gods,
revealed through the king, was the source of authority.5 But
the theocratic idea, and its deduction, were weakened when
aristocracy replaced monarchy," and codes were introduced
to securalize law and control the nobles. The highest function
of the State was the judicial. Even in theocratic times, the duties
of kings were emphasized and the acts of rulers were judged by
the same standards as those of other men."
The Sophists, in promoting individualism, in denying fixed
rules of conduct and attacking the rationality of nature, in basing
political authority on might, in distinguishing law from morality,
in identifying law with political authority, which often forced
men to act contrary to the dictates of reason, introduced into
political thought a distinctly modern note and swept away many
ancient dogmas. These sceptical views of the Sophists are said
to have undermined ethics and law. The disorder of Athenian
democracy gave rise to the moral postulates of Socrates, Plato
and Aristotle. Socrates believed that the fundamental principles
of right and justice could be discovered, that the State is a neces-
sary result of human needs and that its laws, if wise, will cor-
respond to universal reason. He restored the connection between
political and ethical theory.28
Plato's State was as ideal as, in its different way, is that of
Austin. Assuming that the mass of individuals should be sub-
ject to the guidance of the few, Plato pictured in The Rcpublic the
ideal State in which justice prevailed. He refutes the Sophist
contention that might makes right. Plato finds the origin of the
State in the diversity of men's desires and in the necessity of co-
operation in satisfying them." If an ideal ruler could be
absolute reason-as the controlling power. As absolute reason is super-
human, no fallible man or men can possess sovereignty. Cousin thus elim-
inated sovereignty from his conception of political science.
ISPOLLOCK, HISTORY OF THE SCIENCE OF POLITICS (1890) c. 1; 2 Vso-
GRADOFF, HISTORICAL JURISPRUDENCE (1922) c. 2, 6, 7; WILLOUGHBY, op. Cit.
supra note 5, c. 4 et seq.; POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW (1922) Preface and c. 1.
6 GETTELL, op. cit. supra note 5, at 40; WILLOUGHBY, op. cit. mipra note
5, at 57.
27 Ibid. c. 4; GETTLL, op. cit. supra note 5, at 41.
is GTTELL, op. cit. supra note 5, at 43; WILLOUGHBY, op. cit. supra note
5, c. 5; BARKER, GREEK POLITICAL THEORY, PLATO AND HIS PMcDECssons,
(2d ed. 1925) c. 1, 3, 4, 8, 12 (p. 283), 13; BEROLZHEIMER, op. cit. anpra note
6, c. 2.
"9 BARKER, POLITICAL THOUGHT OF PLATO AND AmsTOTLE (1906) c. 1, § 3;
c. 3, § 3; c. 4, § 4; c. 8; 2 JOWETT AND CAMPBELL, PLATO's RxPIuDLIC (1094)
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found, he maintained, there would be no need for laws, since
such a man should be free from all restraint; but since there is
none such, written laws and customs are necessary as restraints
on all, including the ruler. Conformity to law, therefore, is of
the essence of the State. While denouncing tyranny, as did all
Greeks, and while not enamored of democracy, Plato makes his
preference as to forms of government depend on the extent of
legal restraint exerted upon them.20  Plato conceived justice as
the cornerstone of the ideal State.
Aristotle did not, like Plato, confuse political and ethical ideas.
Aristotle favored popular government in which all citizens took
part. He denied the Sophist doctrine that the laws of the State
are essentially arbitrary; he believed that the State was a natural
and necessary institution for the satisfaction of human needs,
that the fundamental principles of right and justice are found in
nature and are susceptible of discovery by human reason and that
it was the State's duty to adapt this natural law to practical
human needs, modifying it when necessary. As man can only live
effectively in society, Aristotle views the State, as an idea, as
prior to rational man.21
Though concerned with the welfare of the individual, Aristotle
did not regard his approved limitations on State action as dic-
tated by any idea of unassailable individual rights. He regarded
the State as justified by utility to secure the welfare of the aggre-
gate of its citizens, for which end a certain amount of individual
liberty was indispensable. The State he deemed the collective
body of citizens, and was among the first clearly to distinguish
State and government. He is the father of the doctrine of sepa-
ration of powers. He first perceived the interrelation between
politics and economics, and suggested that forms of government
might well vary to suit the needs of different peoples and locali-
xxxii, 3, 30; DUNNING, POLITICAL THEORIES, ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL (1902)
c. 1, 2; WILLOUGHBY, op. cit. supra note 5, c. 8; FOWLER, CITY-STATE OF
THE GREEKS AND ROIiANs (1895) c. 1-4; 2 VINOGRADOFF, op. cit. supra
note 15; c. 2, 6; NETTLESHIP, LECTURES ON THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO (Ben-
son ed. 1898) c. 3, 6, 7, 9; MURRAY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE (1926)
c. 1.
20 Plato's view of form was this: if the government is subject to law,
monarchy is best, democracy worst, and aristocracy holds an intermediate
position. If unrestrained by law, democracy is best, tyranny worst, and
oligarchy intermediate. See GETTELL, op. cit. supra note 5, at 46.
21 GETTELL, op. cit. supra note 5, at 48 et seq.; BRADLEY, ARISTOTLE'S CON-
CEPTION OF THE STATE, IN HELLENICA (Abbott's 2d ed. 1898) 166-222;
COKER, READINGS IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (1914) c. 1-2; JowETT, TIE
POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE (1885) bk. 1 and Introduction; Dunning, The Poli-
tics of Aiistotle (1900) 15 PoL. ScI. Q. 273; CONGREvE, THE POLITICS OF
ARISTOTLE (2d ed. 1874) Introduction; GRANT, THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE
(4th ed. 1885) Essays 1, 3, Appendix C; WILLOUGHBY, op. Cit. supra note
5, c. 11; DUNNING, op. cit. supra note 19, at 49 et seq.
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ties. Though positing the natural inequality of men and the
observation that government is the expression of the superiority
of some men over others, he nevertheless realized that men crave
equality and that a sense of injustice arises through inequality
of privileges. Though believing slavery natural, by reason of
the postulated superiority of some men-especially Greeks-over
others, he nevertheless maintains that one of the main functions
of the State is to secure justice to all. Though favoring a limited
individual freedom, he never actually conceived of civil rights;
and while hinting at the conception of sovereignty, he never con-
sidered the State as the ultimate source of law. This was hardly
possible, perhaps, in view of his belief in the essential identity of
State and individual and of his conception of a law of nature. 2
The Epicurians and especially the Stoics are not without their
influence on Roman and medieval political thought. Though but
little concerned with political affairs, they nevertheless had views
on law and the State which historically are important. Individ-
ual happiness they deemed the aim of life. The connection be-
tween individual and social welfare was minimized, and the State
was regarded as not necessary to the philosophical good life. 3
The Epicurians based the State on individual self-interest and
defined law as an agreement among individuals to be secured
against violence and injustice. Thus the social-contract theory
of the State was foreshadowed. The Stoics conceived of nature
as universal law, and of reason, as the creative source of law, as
its revealer.'-  The eternal character of right and justice as
a dominant force was a concomitant of their pantheistic concep-
tion of nature. The law of nature as fixed, immutable, reflecting
the process of nature, in harmony with reason, the divine element
in the universe, was the Stoic idea of natural law handed down
to medieval political theory through the Roman law. The natural
brotherhood of man, a universal natural law and a common world
citizenship are Stoic ideals. -5 Universal law, universal citizenship,
became practical facts in the Roman Empire, and the idea of
principles of justice common to all men was also adopted in
Roman law. The idea of universal brotherhood, expanded
tl-ough Chiristianity, affected strongly the political movements of
the eighteenth century.
The Greek civic ideal, as exemplified in the city-state, notably
Athens, embodies the beginnings of western political theory and
developed it to a high degree. Its law found its source in a con-
ceptual supreme reason and covered the entire field of morality.
22 GETTEIL, op. cit. supra note 5, at 55.
23 Ibid. 56; WILLOUGHBY, op. cit. supra note 5, c. 12.
24 For a modern view of the alleged sovereignty of reason see M=IrnL%,
op. cit. supra, note 14, c. 5.
25 GrrELL, op. cit. supra, note 5, at 57.
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The State was not based on the relation between sovereign ruler
and people, but on the relation between the community and the
individual, much as Duguit now maintains in his conception of
"public service" and social solidarity. Yet the individual as an
end in himself was an idea hardly suggested, 2 nor the notion
of an independent sovereign as the source of power. Final auth-
ority was vested in the laws rather than in persons-a forerunner
of the modern conception of "the sovereignty of law." 27
Roman Political Theory. Ancient and modern political thought
is bridged by the political conceptions of the Middle Ages. These
conceptions were woven from the strands of the political theory
of the Roman jurists and the Christian fathers and in turn were
passed on to the Renaissance and Reformation. They find their
modern reflection in the English and French Revolutions and in
the bills of rights of modern constitutions.
The Romans did not formulate any system of political philoso-
phy, as did the Greeks. Yet in their practical administration of
a world State over a period of centuries, they developed certain
ideas which mark an advance toward modernity. Perhaps the
most important of these advances over Greek thought are the
conception of positive law, of legislation, of an abstract State as
distinct from society in general, the idea of legal personality
and possibly of sovereignty. Politics and ethics became indepen-
dent conceptions. The State and the individual were distinct
and their respective obligations and claims were the subject of
legal regulation, practical administration and theoretical specu-
lation. The State was deemed necessary to law and to social
existence; but the individual and his protection, even against
the group, was the principal raison d'itre of the State-an idea
which is the basis of public law and of modern democracy. For
us, perhaps the most important of the Roman contributions to
our subject are the raising of the individual to an independent
status as the subject of legal rights, the limitations placed upon
the State and its governors, and the protection of the individual
by legal process against any governmental encroachment beyond
or trangression of these limitations.
For the period of Roman history down through about the
2
G Fustel de Coulanges states that man did not enjoy liberty in ancient
cities. He had no rights against the city. The political right to vote was
called liberty. LA CITb ANTIQUE (26th. ed. 1920) 265. Hermann says that
freedom consisted merely in knowing that he was dependent on no power,
since each of his fellow-citizens is on an equality with him under the law.
LEHRBUCH DER GRIECHISCHEN RECHTSALTERTHUMER (Thalheim's ed. 1884)
28; cf. 2 VINOGRADOFF, op. cit. supra, note 15, c. 6. This is analogous to
Rousseau's theory of the individual in his relation to the general will and
the State. Duguit, The Law and the State (1917) 31 HARV. L. REv. 1, at 37,
(quoting Fustel and Hermann).
27 Infra. p. 1089.
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second century A. D. the idea prevailed that the power of the
governors-king, magistrate or emperor-was granted by the
people, as the ultimate source of authority, and that the power
was limited by the terms of the supposed contract under which
it had been granted. It was only toward the end of the Empire
that the assumed irrevocable nature of the grant, strengthened by
the notion that the authority was of divine origin, was used, as in
the case of Hobbes, to justify autocratic government. -5
The theory of the creation of law experienced an autonomous
evolution. At first, as in the ancient world generally, it was
regarded as traditional popular custom, with a large element
of religious injunction and prescription, with a theological sanc-
tion. Then came the codification of the people's customs in the
Twelve Tables, and with it the recession of the religious ele-
ment and of the idea that custom was the chief source of law.
About 200 B. C. the idea gained support that the State and the
human beings who managed it were the source of law and legis-
lation. But even so, it was not conceived as an imposed com-
mand by superior to inferior, but as a contract between magis-
trates and people.
The Roman conceptions of the philosophy and purpose of law
in their relation to the State are most clearly expressed by Cicero
(106-43 B. C.) who in his works followed the form adopted by
Plato. We learn from the writings of Cicero, notably in frag-
ments of De Republica and of De Legibus, that in the Roman view
the ultimate principle behind all positive law and behind the
State itself, was justice. Justice is the foundation of law and
of organized society, and has the character of natural law exist-
ing independently of the consent of man.2D Where there is no
justice, there can be no :is, no State, no populus, but only a
multitude of disorganized people.-" There appears to have been
no definite view of the source of justice and how it was made
known, a problem which gave rise to numerous theories, in-
cluding theological postulates of revealed and divine origins.
28 GErIELL, op. cit. svpra note 5, at 63; DuNNING, op. cit. npra note
19, at 106 et seq.; FOWLER, CrrY-STATE OF THE GnRuEs ,w l. Roimus (1895),
c. 7 et seq.; COKER, READINGS IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (1914) c. 3; 2 Mo:i,-
SEN, R&5MISCHES STAATSRECHT (2d ed. 1877) 728 et. seq.; WILLOUGHBY,
op. cit. stpra note 5, at 215 et seq.
2.1 Cicero's Republic is in part known to us through St. Augustine. Do
CIrATE DEI (426) c. 2, 21 (1 Dods' transl. (1871) under the title of THE-
CITY oF GoD, 74); CIcEO, DE RE PUBLICA, (Pascal's ed. 1916) c. 43, 44.
See for the political theories of Cicero the excellent work of the Carlyle,
I CARLYLE, A HISTORY OF MDIEVAL POLITICAL THEORY IN TIE WEr (190-
1922) 4 et seq.; DUNNING, op. cit. su~p a note 19, at 122. See also FATHn-
STONHAUGH, THE REPUBLIC OF CIcERO (1829) bk. 2; WILLOUGHBY, 0.0. Cit.
supra note 5, c. 19. On St. Augustine and Medievalism se_ Murw'.Ay, op.
cit. supra, note 19, c. 2.
30 Dr CIv. DEi, c. 19, 21 (2 Dods' transl. 3 0).
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Nevertheless, the view that justice- as the mores then conceived
that ethical injunction-underlay all civil law, and that this was
a universal truth of natural law, influenced permanently the
Roman law and the modern law, notwithstanding occasional
suggestions that expediency or force alone determines those
adjustments represented in positive law.31
Cicero's view, derived from the Stoics, of the universality, su-
premacy, and binding character of natural law, which ante-
dates every state, as against a contrary rule of civil law, is re-
flected by Grdtius, Spinoza and Locke and by the modern Duguit
and Krabbe in their view as to the relation of the laws of "social
solidarity" or men's "sense of right" to positive law. Cicero re-
garded civil law which was not derived from natural law as hav-
ing the formal character of law only but not its true character."
It was not jusA3 So Duguit and Krabbe, to the mystification
31 This was the view of HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, c. 26. A late expression of
this criticism is to be found in the work of the Swedish jurist LUNDSTEDT,
SUPERSTITION OR RATIONALITY IN ACTION FOR PEACE (1925) Preface.
There appear to have been even in Cicero's time opponents of the view
that justice has a relation to law or that there is such a thing as justice
or jus naturale. They maintained, on the contrary, that justice is foolish-
ness, that laws are based solely on expediency and that the only source
of virtue is human agreement. See Carneades, cited by Cicero, Book III,
5, 8; FEATHERSTONHAUGH, op. cit. supra note 29, Introd., 29; 1 CARLYLE, op.
cit. supra note 29, at 5. Cicero speaks of the "common sense of right"
(see Krabbe's like conception, infra) and "community of interest" as that
which unites a multitude into a people or commonwealth. I Do Republica,
25, and DUNNING, op. cit. supra note 19, at 120.
32 DE LEGIBUS, libri tres. (Feldhilgel's ed. 1852) I, 6, 19, 20; 10, 28; 15,
42; 16, 45, cited by 1 Carlyle, op. cit. supra note 29, at 6. The canon lawyers,
like Gratian, took much the same view of the relation of natural law to
positive law. They identified natural law with divine law, and human
law with custom (mores). GRATIAN, DECRETUm, D. I, quoted in 2 CARlYLe,
supra, at 98. This is directly traceable to Cicero's view that the law of
nature is the law of God. See passages cited in 1 CARLYLE, op. cit. supra, at 5,
6. See also Austin's identification of the law of God and the law of nature
(so far as these words have a meaning) with the rules required by the
theory of utility. PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1863) Lectures
2, 3, and 4. MAINE, EARLY HISTORY OF INSTITUTIONS (1875) 369, criticizes
the attempted identification as "gratuitous and valueless for any purpose."
33 Even in those days the varying uses of the term law created confusion.
In Greek philosophy the distinction between right (8tKato1,) and law
(vulot) had been recognized. Right was deemed superior to and inde-
pendent of law. Right involved (a) abstract goodness and (b) a group
of enforcible privileges. The Greeks were concerned primarily with (a);
the Romans with (b). Cicero was not always clear as to what be meant
by natural rights (jus naturale). In Book I of DE LEGIBUS be argues that
rights (jus) are subordinate to and dependent on law (lex), and that the
lex naturalis is the source and limit of all rights, even natural (jus na-
turale). It is hard to tell what he means by "nature." DUNNING, op. cit.
supra note 19, at 124. Gaius did not limit his theory of law to positive
law, but based it on universal and rational principles-an ideal "law".
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of the analytical jurist, deny the quality of law to statutes violat-
ing the principles of social solidarity and "sense of right." -'
How we are to tell when statutes fail to meet the standard set
or how the consequences of disobedience are to be avoided neither
Cicero nor Duguit nor Krabbe make clear. Yet the philosophical
system which gave such a preponderant position to natural law
and identified it with justice lies at the basis of the social struct-
ure of the Christian era and cannot be lightly disregarded.-7
34Willoughby, The Juristic Thco'ies of Krabbe (1920) 20 A:t. POL. SCL
REv. 509, 519. Willoughby surmises that Krabbe would deny the ethical
force of such statutes, but would not suggest that they be disobeyed. Wil-
loughby concludes that if Krabbe merely denies their ethical, but not their
formal, validity, the analytical jurist has no occasion to quarrel.
5 That the content of natural law was varyingly conceived docs not
militate against the importance of this theory. Ulpian conceived it as a
system common to the entire animal world. Reason, as an element of
natural law, was a later conception. Gaius viewed the jus vattvale as
practically the same as the frs gent imz. Ulpian did not. Ulpian's view
probably ultimately prevailed, though Grotius drew on both for his system
of international law. Cicero thought of natural law as part of the eternal
law of God, and that seems to have been Gains' view of the ins gentiewl.
Both Cicero and Gaius regard law as a rational and just principle of life,
not enacted by men, but the expression of universal and natural reason
and sense of justice. See 1 CARLYLE, op. cit. supra note 29, at 3S; ECK-
STEIN, DAS ANTIEE NATURRECHT (1926) ; ef. I,-EABE, MODERN ID A OF THE
STATE (1922) c. 2, 3; see chapter on "The History of the Law of Nature,"
in POLLOCK, ESSAYS IN THE LAW (1922) 31; BYCEs, op. cit. avpre, note 5,
Essay 11.
The views of other Roman lawyers as to the relation between iz.,s ntu'-
ale, jus gentium and ius cihile are set forth in 1 CRLYLE, op. cit. mqwa,
note 29, c. 3. The Christian fathers viewed natural law as a body of
principles ideal in nature and adapted to a state of innocence, hence not
related to man's actual world. They identified it with the law of God,
much as Cicero had, in terms, done. 1 CArLimE, op. cit. aupra, note 29, c. 9.
Yet they conceived it as a guiding rule of conduct for all men. Through
St. Isidore, this view passed into Gratian's Decretum and the Canon law.
St. Thomas Aquinas did not regard the lex naturalis as immutable; on the
contrary, it could be enlarged by provisions for human welfare, c. g., private
property and slavery. DUNNING, op. cit. supra note 19, at 195; E. F. Jacob
in CRUMP AND JACOB, LEGACY OF THE MIDDLE AGES (1920) 525 et ocq.
William of Ockham in the fourteenth century presented views quite differ-
ent from Ulpian's. Jus vaturale, he said, could be tahen in three senses;
(1) universal rules of conduct dictated by natural reason; (2) rules which
would be accepted as reasonable and are, therefore, binding, in a society
governed by natural equity, without positive law or custom; (3) rulss
justified by deduction or analogy from the general precepts of the law of
nature, but modifiable by positive authority. DL,Luoas III, tr. II, 1. 3, c. 6,
p. 932 cited by POLLOCK, op. cit. supra, at 38. See also DUtNING, op. cit.
supra, at 244; Sauter, Das Naturrecht im Idcalismus des MittelaItcr (1927)
6 ZTSCHR. F. OFF. RECHT, 381. It was only after the Reformation, with its
loss of respect for authority, that philosophers v.ere able to detach natural
law from God and to transfer it to impersonal human reason. See, on the
rise and decline of natural law, BEROLZHEI!ER, op. cit. szupra note 6, C. 5.
In more recent times, it has been denied that volitional quality deemed by
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Cicero's view of the equality of human nature plays an im-
portant part throughout political history. For the Greek view
of natural inequality, the Romans substituted that of natural
equality. The Christian doctrines carried on the ideal of human
equality; it was strengthened for medieval political theory after
the fall of Rome by the Germanic conception of equality and
popular control of government.-3
The natural organization of society in the State is a direct
consequence of the view, expounded by Cicero, of the natural
equality of men. The State must be founded on law and on
justice, and must exist for the promotion of the common wel-
many essential to law. But in the interpretation of law, notably the bills
of rights of constitutions, it plays even now an important part. Probably
in no country are conceptions of natural law carried into practice more
effectively than in the United States, in the interpretation of the "due proc-
ess" clause of the Constitution and of such phrases as "vested rights".
It also exerts much influence in English courts. See Keeler, Survival of the
Theory of Natural Rights in Judicial Decisions (1895) 5 YALE LAW JOUR-
NAL, 14; Haines, Law of Nature in State and Federal Judicial Decisions
(1916) 25 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 617; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, at
329, 42 Sup. Ct. 124, at 128; RITCHIE, NATURAL RIGHTS (1894) c. 2; Sal-
mond, The Law of Nature (1895) 11 L. Q. REV. 121. Pollock calls the law
of nature, "a living embodiment of the collective reason of civilized man-
kind." POLLOCK, EXPANSION OF THE ColmON LAW (1904) 128, and gen-
erally Lecture 4. The identification of the natural and the rational, and
aligning both with what is morally right, has served a useful purpose in
the growth of law. See "Natural Law" in Pound, The End of Law (1914)
27 HARv. L. REV. 195, 213; ibid. The scope and Purpose of Sociological
Jurisprudence (1911) 24 HARV. L. Rav. 591, at 608; Dewey, Nature and
Reason in Law, (1915) 25 INT. J. OF ETHICS, 25; Cohen, Jus Naturale
Redivivum (1916) 25 PHLOSOPHICAL REV. 761. Some of the modern
theories of the law of nature are reviewed in BASU, MODERN THEORIES OF
JURISPRUDENCE, (1925) 109 et seq. Lorimer thought only natural law or
just law entitled to the name law. INSTITUTES OF LAW (1872); SOIL6,
JURISTIsCHE GRUNDLEHRE (1917) § 44; DEL VECCHIO, FORsAL BASES OF
LAW (1914) §§ 198, 199; POUND, LAW AND MORALS, (1924) 125, (valuable
bibliography).
30 Both Roman lawyers and the church fathers proceed from the postu-
late that God made man free and equal. They had no easy task to explain
the actual inequality they saw about them and notably the institution of
slavery, which the theologians justified as a remedial punishment for sin.
Slavery was contrary to nature, and yet it existed. Here was a great field
for rationalization. See 1 CARLYLE, op. cit. supra note 29, c. 2, 10.
But natural equality also contradicts any subjection of man to man in
government. Coercive government is therefore not natural, but is also
deemed to have been made necessary through sin. The Church fathers
represented government as a divine institution, and by commanding obed-
ience, even to an unjust government, did much to strengthen royal author-
ity. Ibid. c. 11; Dunning, op. cit. supra note 19, at 176-178. Their views
as to obedience were not always followed by writers after the sixth cen-
tury. See also Radin, Roman Concepts of Equality (1923) 38 PoL. SCl, Q.
262.
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fare, otherwise Cicero denied it the character of a State.37 Yet
the realization that man is often corrupt and depraved and that
society needs protection laid the ground for a theory of the State
based on its remedial functions to correct evil. Cicero was aware
of this view and made a place for it, but sympathized with the
larger view of natural equality which was so strikingly revived
by the philosophers of modern democracy. The form of govern-
ment, king, a small group, or the people, was not to Cicero so
important as the end which all government must serve-the
general welfare. Cicero also identified liberty with a share in
political power and thus again discloses both his debt to Greece
and his essential modernity. Though Cicero was no friend of
popular government, his successors Ulpian and Gaius kmew no
other foundation of political authority than the consent of the
whole people, an idea which was employed effectively to challenge
the later claims of absolutism. The commonwealth was for
the early Romans an organic development from the natural as-
sociation of men in the family and in groups, and at the same
time the expression of the common consent, founded on law and
justice and designed to promote the general welfare.
The canonists and civilians of the early Middle Ages conceived
this State as a sacred institution designed to establish a measure
of justice and order in a corrupt world, a conceptual character
not widely different from that with which Hobbes endowed his
metaphysical sovereign.
It is also worthy of note that the theory of the civil law of the
Roman lawyers whose views were embodied in Justinian's In-
stitutes, and the theory of the medieval lawyers, related positive
law to the limitations of a guiding principle, sometimes called
justice, reason, jus or aequitas. These terms were not always
understood in the same sense, but it is noteworthy that down
to the fourteenth century, the civilians considered law (jis)
as the embodiment of the principle of justice and that positive
law was the result of the application of these principles to daily
life. Js was derived from justitcl., and meant, for Ulpian (Dig.
I, 1, 11) ars boni et aeq'i. If positive law was too harsh, it was
modified by a judge applying oequitas, just as the English courts
of equity built up a system ameliorating the rules of the strict
common law. Irnerius, the great scholar of Bologna, whose
writings have been rescued by Fitting, maintained that laws
which are contrary to equity should not be enforced by the
judge.3s Views naturally differed as to what should be the fate
of a law deemed unjust or contrary to equity, but one thing
3 7 DE REP. I, 26, 41, 42; DE REP., III, in ST. AVGusrxTN, DE Crv. I. 21,
cited in 1 CALu, op. cit. szpra note 29, at 15.
-8 The canon lawyers, regarding natural law as divine law, also regardcd
it as superior in dignity and permanence to certain positive forms of the
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seems clear-'law was not deemed an expression of sovereign
will, as Bodin and his successors maintained, but the application
to actual conditions of certain fundamental principles of justice
commonly accepted by the learning of the period and by popular
conceptions. The civil law was deemed subject to those uni-
versally controlled moral principles which passed under the name
of natural law, though it was necessarily admitted that certain
institutions, like slavery, existed and were recognized, though
contrary to natural law.2 The important fact to remember,
however, is that no law-maker was deemed to have an uncon-
trolled power over legislation, that legislation was deemed sub-
ject to conformity with certain equitable and moral principles
which were in most cases enforced by the courts, and had the au-
thority of the jurists and the support of the people. Such ideas
must have exerted an important influence throughout the Mid-
dle Ages, by emphasizing the limited power of the law-maker
and the qualified authority of legislation, even if the system of
judicial or popular control was only rudimentarily developed.A0
There seems but little doubt that the Roman jurists down to
Justinian regarded the Roman people as the source of political
authority and as the ultimate law-making power.41  Notwith-
standing the fact that the Emperor, both with and without the
Senate, was given the power to declare the law, this was deemed
a delegated power only. Ulpian's well-known phrase Quod prin-
law of God, and of course superior to all authorities in Church oi State,
including positive law and custom. See GRATIAN, DECRETUM, D. III, pt.
II, quoted in 2 CARLYLE, op. cit. supra note 29, at 105.
39 The canon lawyers had an especially difficult time explaining why
the supposed immutable natural law of their conception, which decreed
equality of all men and ownership of all things in common, could be
changed by such, flourishing institutions as slavery and private property,
which were, according to them admittedly created by the law of the State.
The difficulty was overcome to their satisfaction by assuming that such
conventional institutions of society are the results of sin and are intended
to control sin. See the canon law theory of natural law. Ibid. c. 3.
40 1 ibid. c. 5; 2 ibid. c. 1-3; DUNNING, op. cit. supra note 19, at 127
et seq. See commentary of BARTOLUS on CODEX, (I, 14, 4) p. 87 (I, 22, 6)
p. 112 quoted in WOOLF, BARTOLUS OF SASSAFERATO, HIS POSITION IN THE
HISTORY OF MEDIEvAL POLITICAL THOUGHT (1913) 46.
4' 1 CARLYLE, op. cit. supra note 29, c. 6, cites Ulpian and others to this
effect. Marcianus (DIG. I, 3, 2) states: "This is law which all men should
obey for many reasons, and especially because every law is a thing found
and given by God, a judgment of wise men, a correction of voluntary and
involuntary trangressions, a common agreement of the State, in accordance
with which all those who are in the State should live." 1 CARLYLE, op. Cit.
supra, at 69. This, at the height of the Empire, hardly supports a theory
of absolute law-making power in the emperor. Others affirmed that tho
emperor, through irrevocable grant, had the sole power to make general
laws. WOOLF, op. cit. supra not 40, at 36 et. seq., quoting Bartolus' com-
mentary on the Code.
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cipi placuit, legis lwbet vigorew 42 is followed by words distinctly
showing the qualified nature and the source of the power 3
Custom had the force of law, because it was derived like all
law, from the authority of the people." The Twelve Tables
were compiled, in order that the State might be founded on
laws (leges). Law is also described as an agreement of the
whole State and Theodosius and Valentinian declare that the
prince is bound by the laws, for his authority is drawn from
the authority of law,45 a statement followed by Bracton eight
centuries later."0
The Church Fathers and the Ciilians. Although the Church
had in the centuries from the sixth to the thirteenth achieved
considerable support for the view that government and king
rested on divine authority, and that the law was similarly in-
spired, there is yet must evidence that the kingly law-making
authority was regarded as part of a compact of delegation from
the people and that deposition of an arbitrary king was deemed
proper.4 7 The civilians of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries,
drawing their inspiration from the Roman law, were unanimous
in recognizing that the people were the ultimate source of poli-
tical authority and of the law.4 ; This also was the Teutonic
conception, so that both learned authority and popular conviction
supported the theory of delegated authority of the ruler as a law-
maker, his responsibility to the people and, as we shall see, his
12 DIG. I, 4, 1; Borchard, op. cit. szpra note 2, at 791.
43 "Utpote curn lege regia, quae de impcrio ejw lata est, popduis d et in
euma omne suum imperium et potestaten con crat." See Pomponius'
historical development of the source of legislation, quoted in 1 CALYLE,
op. cit. supra note 29, at 67, notes. Bracton apparently did not fully under-
stand Ulpian's phrase, for he uses it ambiguously to support both unlimited
and limited authority. The first part of the phrase, standing alone, was
often used to sustain arbitrary royal power. The erroneous interpreta-
tions placed upon this familiar phrase, notably in giving it an unrestricted
meaning, are pointed out by Amos in his note (p. 125) to ch. 34 of his
edition of FORTESCUE, DE LAUDIBUS LEGUni ANGLIAE (1825).
44 The canon lawyers of the early Middle Ages went even further. They
regarded all laws, properly speaking, as custom, and taught that legislation,
where it existed, must be confirmed by and could be rendered void if in
conflict with custom. See quotations from St Isidore and Gratian quoted
in 2 CARLYmE, op. cit. supra note 29, at 98, 100, and e. S. See, however,
the ambiguities in Gratian disclosed ibid. 156. In the DEcrmT,'.s (Gregory
IX) I, 4, 11, it is said that custom overrides all law except that of nature
and reason; but it had to be an old custom. See quotation in 2 CAnLvE,
op. cit. supra, at 158, n. 1.
4 A rescript of 429, found in the famous Dignar o:x passage of the Code,
CODEX I, 14, 4, quoted by 1 CARLYiLE, op. cit. supra note 29, at 69, n.
46 Infra, p. 1060.
7 1 CARLIME, op. cit. supra note 29, c. 20.
41 See the authority of Azo, Hugolinus and Irnerius cited 2 ibid. c. 7.
But see Bartolus, quotations in WOOLP, op. cit. supra note 40, at t0-40.
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subjection to law-though what quality of law is not always
clear. It should not be overlooked, however, that the civilians
were not altogether unanimous as to the extent to which the
people had parted with their original authority. Some asserted
that the grant had become irrevocable. Yet Carlyle, after a
full consideration of the opinions of the leading jurists of the
time, concludes that this was a minority view and that a per-
manent, unresumable delegation of power was not generally
deemed to have been made.49
The direct source of the irresponsible sovereign of Hobbes'
conception is probably to be traced to the political theory of
several of the Christian fathers, notably St. Gregory. We have
already observed that they regarded Government as a divine
institution, a divine remedy for man's sin, and the ruler as the
representative of God who must be obeyed in the name of God,
even when he acts wickedly or violently. He is to be reverenced
as the "Vicar of God," said some of these ecclesiastics. In St.
Gregory, the doctrine is worked out to its ultimate end. Good
subjects do not criticize a bad ruler; to resist him is to offend
God. The seventeenth-century apologists for Divine Right and
monarchical sovereignty thus drew their inspiration for the
absolute and irresponsible authority of the ruler from a theo-
logical argument which, though strongly contested by the legal
writers of the Middle Ages, nevertheless survived because it
became helpful to certain rulers and certain Churchmen on
occasion to invoke it.
Carlyle suggests that the motives and grounds for thus ex-
aggerating and misstating the divine authority of the ruler arise
out of (a) the need of correcting the anarchical tendencies which
threatened the primitive church, as well as the need of disarming
the hostility of the Empire; (b) the relation between Church
-and Emperor after the conversion of Constantine; and (c)
the alleged sacred character of the authority and person of the
King of Israel. The danger of disintegration and the need for
unassailable authority led to similar exaggerations of the ab-
solutists in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, who again
seek in an unchallengeable First Cause that authority they wish
to strengthen-though in effect an authority which is derived,
even from God, can hardly be ultimate. The history of medieval
political theory represents largely a struggle between the law-
yer's view that the people are the source of authority in the
State and the theologian's view that God, through his agent,
the ruler, is the source of authority. Yet it is curious to note
that the advocates occasionally change sides, for, from the
eleventh to the fourteenth centuries, the Imperialist party de-
-1 Bartolus seems to believe that the grant was irrevocable. Ibid.
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fends the theory of Divine authority of the ruler, and the ec-
clesiastical, the theory of popular authority.-" Feudalism intro-
duced new ideas of the contractual nature of authority and
subjection, presently to be considered.
It must also be observed that many Christian fathers had a
conception of the State and of authority quite different from
that of St. Gregory. While they regarded coercive government
as not natural, but conventional and useful for the punishment
of sin, they conceived the State as an instrument for securing
justice. A king who failed to maintain justice was deemed
no king, though they differed in their views as to the conse-
quences of injustice by the king. Some threatened him with
the judgment of God, some denounced his title to the kingship,
others merely deplored the fact without counselling disobedience
or resistance. Justice, however, they maintained, is the r.isw,
d'itre of the State and distinguishes it from a band of robbers.
Clement defines a king as one who rules according to law. and is
willingly obeyed by his subjects; St. Ambrose regarded the king
as bound by the laws, and argues that the emperor who mahes
the laws is also bound to obey them.z' St. Isidore of Seville
also urged the propriety of the prince respecting his own laws.
Subjects will learn obedience when they see their rulers observ-
ing the laws52 Yet the suggestion that the emperor is legibvs
solutzs r3 tended to confuse ideas. St. Augustine, one of the most
influential of the Christian fathers in the development of politi-
cal theory, is not always clear. At one place, he adopts the
Ciceronean view that there can be no true State without jus-
tice; where there is no justice, there can be no jus. Yet he also
admits that a State may exist, though corrupt, provided it
consists of a multitude of people agreeing to associate. From
this conception, the elements of law and justice, so important to
Cicero, the Roman lawyers and many of the Church fathers, ara
omitted. This may have influenced St. Gregory in his opinion
as to the unrestricted authority of the ruler. The divine au-
thority of government and that of the personal ruler became
confused, so that an evil king also was deemed to derive his
authority from God. Cassiodorus exhibits this confusion of
ideas. While maintaining that justice is the keystone of the
State, he also appears to regard the king not only as the source
of law, but as one who normally stands above it; that he is
accountable to God alone, but cannot be said to sin against others,
zo See the extracts from St. Gregory quoted by 1 C,=LYLn, op. cit. -zpa
note 29, c. 13.
s' See the quotations from St. Ambrose Ep. XXI, 9, ibid. 1M4.
52 St. Isidore in Sent. I1, 51, quoted ibid. n. 5.
C'3 Borchard, op. cit. s.pra note 2, at 791 et. seq.
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for there is none who can judge him.5 4 The populus consists of
a multitude of people agreeing to live in harmonious society.
St. Isidore, however, reemphasizes the essential character of
justice both to the State and to the ruler, and denies the legiti-
macy of the unjust ruler. His view that it is proper for a prince
to obey his own laws 5 passed into Gratian's Decretum.
Thus, with the possible exception of St. Augustine, St. Gregory,
and Cassiadorus, it would seem that the Church fathers con-
ceived the end of the State as the maintenance of justice and
regarded justice as essential to the legitimacy of government.
This view counteracts the tendency of those churchmen who up-
held the absolute and divine authority of the ruler, with the
consequence of unquestioned obedience. Both views are reflected
in the polemics of the Middle Ages.50 In the seventeenth century
we find Hobbes asserting the doctrine that the only test of law
is utility and expediency, and Grotius maintaining that there is
an essential justice and morality founded in the nature of
things, and controlling both men and nations. 7
In the period between the ninth and thirteenth centuries we
are again impressed with the patristic conceptions, not unlike
those of the lawyers, of the natural equality of all men. Carlyle
informs us that in a collection of capitularies issued by the Em-
peror Lewis the Pious, he recognizes his equality in condition
with other men.58
The Teutonic Tradition. In this period, the Teutonic tradi-
tion made itself felt in political literature. To the divine and
unlimited authority of State and king, which to some extent the
patristic tradition had taught, there was opposed, often in the
same man, the Teutonic conception of the limited and restricted
authority of the ruler. The difficulty of setting the limits of
the ecclesiastical and civil powers also produced a certain fric-
tion which tended to destroy any unqualified theory of the ab-
solute power of the State.5 The rupture between the Bishop of
Rome and the iconoclastic emperors tended to neutralize the
tradition of St. Gregory of the divine authority of State and king.
54 CASSIODoRuS, Exp. IN PSALT., PS. 1, 5, quoted in 1 CARLYLE, op. Cit.
supra note 29, at 171, n. 4. The resemblance of this argument to that of
Blackstone as to why the king can do no wrong, and to that of the
Austinians as to why the State is irresponsible, is striking.
55 ST. ISIIORE, SENTENTIAE III, 51, quoted ibid. 173, n. 6.
56 Ibid. c. 14.
57 GROTIUS, (Whewell's ed. 1853) I, 1, 10; ibid. I, 1, 12; HOBBES, op. Cit.
supra note 31, c. 26; GETTELL, op. cit. supra note 5, at 190.
58 See quotation from MON. GERMAN. HIsT. LEG. § 2, v. I, No. 137 in 1
CARLYLE, op. cit. supra note 29, at 201. Slavery is still recognized,
paradoxically, but it is explained as a necessary and wholesome discipline,
as is coercive government, Ibid. 210.
59 Ibid. 211, and c. 17.
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The uneducated and semi-barbarous Teutonic kings did not in-
vite the ascription to them of Godly omnipotence and unquali-
fied obedience; and as the churchmen were in large part them-
selves Teutons accustomed to government by common counsel of
the king with his wise men or with popular assent, the direct
opposite of unlimited authority, it is not unnatural that the
theory of the sacred and unlimited authority of the ruler was
considerably weakened, 0
Although the limitation of royal power by the necessity of
doing justice appears to have been part of the cultural tradition
of the ninth century and of those immediately following, it is
not easy to circumscribe the concept justice. Respect for the
existing law, however, seems one of the essentials of justice, and
the notion that the king was bound by the laws and was not
superior to them seems fairly universal in that period.61 This
conclusion is justified from another point of view. In Justinian's
Rome, the emperor was regarded as the source of law, the sole
legis-lator, though it is true that his authority was in theory re-
garded as delegated by the people. Yet he did legislate and the
force of law attached to his decrees. Whatever the obscure
legibus solutus may really have meantc2 it is certain that the
king in Charlemagne's time was not the sole legislator. He was
a part of the law-making authority, but the consent of the
council and, in a larger sense, of the people, was also deemed a
necessary factor in the creation of positive law.2 M oreover
legislation constituted only a small part of the community's law,
the major part consisting of custom, tribal law and the systems
of modified Roman law prevailing in the several portions of the
Empire. Over the latter, king or emperor had little control,
and it is easy to believe that by these laws he was deemed bound.
Feudal Conceptiois. In the feudal period from the tenth to
the thirteenth centuries, it is hard to see any authoritative foun-
dation for a belief that governmental authority was regarded
as irresponsible and unlimited. The essense of the feudal system
of government was contractual. Authority, therefore, was
co The ecclesiastical writers of the ninth century continually set up the
standard of the just king as the only king fit to rule. They look: on
justice as essential to the character of a true ruler. Without justice he is
a tyrant and not a king. See the authorities quoted ibid. c. 18.
6 Carlyle quotes at length from the works of Hinemar of Rlheims and
others to show that the consensus of opinion made the king subject to the
laws. Ibid. c. 19. There are, however, certain ambiguities in Hincmar
which might indicate that while the king was subject to the divine law, he
was not necessarily subject to the positive laws of his own creation, though
in fact the king alone did not legislate. Cf. ibid. 231 et. seq.62 Borchard, op. cit. supra note 2, at 791 et. seq.
63STUBBS, CONSTITUTIONAL HisToRY or ENGLAND, (5th ed. 1891) 141
et. seq.
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sharply defined and limited. Carlyle points out that if medieval
society seems to oscillate between arbitrary despotism and
anarchical confusion, this is not because of uncertainty as to
the rights and duties of rulers and subjects, but is due to the ab-
sence of effective administrative instrumentalities of govern-
ment." To the men of the Middle Ages the justification of the au-
thority of State and ruler was the maintenance of the principle of
justice. This conception lies at the foundation of feudal law.03 We
have already observed that Bracton conceived of the king as the
authority to do justice, that he can do nothing except that which
he can do lawfully, and that the phrase Quod placuit principe
habet legis vigorem is followed by the words cum lege regi, quae
de imperio lat est, meaning that not his arbitrary will makes
law, but only his will to make law, with the counsel of his mag-
istrates and after due deliberation and discussion. The authority
is the authority of law (or right) not of wrong. When the
king does justice .he is the vicar and servant of God; when he
does wrong, he is the servant of the devil. The king has his
title from the fact that he governs well and not from the fact
that he reigns. Let him therefore restrain his authority by the
law, which is the bridle of authority, let him live according to
law, for it is the principle of human law that laws bind him who
makes them. 6
In this passage Bracton summarizes the feudal tradition. The
views expressed have their roots in the Roman law and in cer-
tain phases of the patristic doctrine. Authority was supportable
only to the extent that it represented the principle of justice, of
which an essential element was the observance of the commun-
ity's law; to the medieval mind the law embodied the practical
form of justice, and to the feudalist, law is the foundation of
authority, so that Bracton could say, "There is no King where
will rules and not law." 6T While Bracton asserts that the king
is under no man, but only under God, he also affirms that the
64 3 CARLYLE, op. cit. supra note 29, at 31.
65 See the quotation from the Assizes of the Court of Burgesses of Jeru-
salem, ibid. 32, to the effect that the authority of the lord is only "to do
law or justice", but not an authority de faire tort, Which Carlyle translates,
"to behave unjustly."
60 BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE, III, 9, 2, fol. 107 b.
(2 Woodbine's ed. (1922) 304); 3 CARLYLE, op. cit. supra note 29, at 35;
EHRLICH, PROcEEDINGs AGAINST THE CROWN (1921) 40 et. seq.
6T BRAcTON, op. cit. supra note 66, I, 8, 5, fol. 5 b; see also 3 CARLYLE, Op.
cit. supra note 29, at 35. In Bracton's view the king was bound to redress
wrongs done by himself or on his behalf, and he was also bound to dis-
charge other obligations as would a private person. A person having a
claim against another, would have a like claim against the king, if the
latter was the wrongdoer. "Since he is subject to [the law] he ought
firmly to observe it." fol. 171 b. (3 Twiss' ed. 95). "And it is to be known
that to say that I cannot answer without the king is nothing else than to
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king is under the law, for the law makes the king, and he
should be as the least in receiving the judgment of the law.9
The obligations incidental to the principle of personal loyalty
and protection embodied in feudalism were also conditioned on
reason and justice, and negatived anything like absolutism.
When the conception of loyalty was transferred from the in-
dividual lord to the State, it was not deemed to alter the nature
of the subjection from limited to unlimited.
It must also be observed that to the feudal period the notion
that law is made and the conception of sovereignty, as now
understood, were entirely foreign. The law was primarily cus-
tom, handed down as a part of the national life, and legislation
was deemed merely an embodiment of existing law5P The re-
lative place of legislation and custom, or whether legislation
contrary to custom could be recognized, is not always clear.
By the thirteenth century, legislation was acknowledged as a
distinct source of law. It was conceived as promulgated by the
king, with the advice of a council of wise men, and with the
assent and for the welfare of the people. The laws cannot be
abrogated or changed without the consent of all those by whose
counsel and consent they were made.-0  This is not unlike the
views prevailing in the ninth century. What happened if the
laws thus promulgated were not conducive to the general wel-
fare is not certain, but contemporary political theory justifies
the conclusion that the people were under no duty to observe
them and were deemed warranted in resistingT'
vouch him to warrant although it is by other vords." Fol. 0082 b. (4 Twiss'
ed. 21).
cs BRDcON, op. cit. supra note 66, I, S. 5, fol. 5b, and Borchard, op. cit.
supra note 2, at 21-23; 3 Cn mm_, op. cit. supra note 29, at 3S, n. 1.
Carlyle also quotes from the Assizes of Jerusalem and other feudal law
books, including the SACHSENSPIEGEML, to show that this subjection of the
king and of the state to law was a common notion of the feudal period.
Ibid. c. 2, 3; see also Borchard, op. cit. szpra note 2, at 19, n. 15; ibid. 793,
n. 116; ibid. 799, n. 119.
6- Bracton, in a passage based on Glanvil, claims that while other
countries use leges and jzw scription, England alone uses unwritten laws
and custom. Op. cit. supra note 66, I, 1, 2, fol: 1; 3 CAr ME, op. cit. upra
note 29, at 42, and c. 3. St. Thomas Aquinas made a considerable contribu-
tion in segregating divine law, natural law and positive law, and establiching
the element of legislation in the latter. Though he thought that written
law lost binding force if in conflict with natural justice (SutILA TnEoLos.
II, 2, 58, 1) he nevertheless conceded a large measure of unrestrictei
authority to the prince. He was influenced mainly by Aristotle and St.
Augustine. DUNNING. op. cit. supra note 19 at 192-204; Caul.P ,:.
JACOB, op. cit. supra note 35, at 525.
TO BR OArON, op. cit. supra note 66, I, 2. 6, fol. 1. Carlyle concludes that
the law in England was not something which the Icing makes or unmaes
at his pleasure, but that is represents an authority which even the king
cannot override. 3 CA L =E, op. cit. spra note 29, at 69.
71 Gratian supported the view that no law was valid unlezs accepted by
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Moreover, important evidence of the -supremacy of the rule
of law is to be found in the judicial arrangements established
for the maintenance and enforcement of the mutual obligations
of lord and vassal. Neither lord nor vassal could unilaterally
interpret the feudal contract and act upon his view; that was
the function of the lord's court, which was composed both of
lord and vassals.72  There is no doubt that the court could pro-
nounce judgment against the lord and that if he did not carry
out the judgment, the whole body of vassals was empowered to
enforce it. The enforcement appears to have taken different
forms in different sections and times, for example, by the vas-
sal holding his fief free from the lord or overlord, by all the
vassals renouncing service to the lord until he had carried out
the judgment or even by taking armed measures against him."3
Beaumanoir states that in France, in a dispute as to feudal ob-
ligations, an appeal lay from the lord's court, in which vassals
the custom of the people. DECRETUm, D. IV, cited in 3 CARLYLE, op. cit.
supra note 29, at 48. See also 2 ibid. at 155. This doctrine was also
maintained by some of the civilians of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.
2 ibid. at 61-63. Cf. BRACTON, op. cit. supra note 66, I, 1, 2, quoted in 3
CARLYLE, op. cit. supra, at 48, n. 3, and the views of BEAUMANOIR, ibid. 49
et. seq., who is sometimes cited in support of a more unlimited authority of
the royal legislator. The right of resistance, which was emphasized by
the Monarchomachs from the sixteenth to the early nineteenth centuries
exerted a powerful influence on the development of the limited and con-
stitutional state. 1 VON MOHL, DiE GESCHICHTE UND L1TERATUIf DER
STAATSWISSENSCHAFTEN (1855) 321; WOLZENDORFF, STAATSREC11T UND
NATURRECHT (1916) pt. 1, 6 et seq.
72 See JEAN D'IBELIN, AsSIZES OF JERUSALEM, quoted in 3 CARLYLE, op. cit.
supra note 29, at 53, n. 1-4. The composition of the court is not altogether
certain; for example, it has been doubted by some whether the lord himself
could sit in it. Ibid. 54.
73 Jean d'Ibelin, quoted ibid. 58, n. 2, and 59. See the extracts
from the CONSUETUDINES FEODORUM, the SACHSENSPIEGEL, LE CONSEIL D11
PiERRE DE FONTAINES, and the ETABLISSEMENTS DE ST. Louis, and from
Beaumanior, showing that in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries it was
the common conception that the feudal lord could be impleaded in the lord's
court and that appropriate measures were available to the vassal to en-
force the judgment. In the ETABLISSEMENTS DE ST. LOUIS it is stated
that the remedy of armed measures is available even against the king of
France if he refuses to do justice in his court. I, 53, quoted in 3 CARLYLE,
op. cit. supra note 29, at 63, n. 2; 2 VIOLLET, LES ETABLISSEMENTS DE ST.
LouIs (1881) 75; also 1 ibid. 18. See generally the quotations from these
feudal law books in 3 CARLYLE, op. cit. supra c. 4; WOLZENDOFF, op. cit. supra
note 71, at 6-23. CRUMP AND JACOB, op. cit. supra note 35, 521; VON
FRISCH, DIE VERANTWORTLICHKEIT DER MONARCHEN (1904) 109 ct. seq.,
asserts that the Middle Age and feudal theory-in contrast to the Roman
theory-maintained the responsibility of King and lord in special courts,
civil or ecclesiatical, but that in practice it is difficult to establish uniformity
of rule. It was largely a question of physical power, whether the lord
would submit to courts. There appears to have been more general submis-
sion in civil cases than in criminal matters.
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sat, to the overlord.74  It is noteworthy that the judges in the
lord's court are vassals and that they administer the customary
law of the land and not the lord's will, caprice or desire.
In Bracton's time the feudal system was being gradually re-
placed by a national monarchy. Disputes as to feudal obligations
go from the lord's court to the county court and thence, if the
king consents, to the "great court".- We have already observed
that in Bracton's view the king was under God and the law,
for it is the law that makes him king and his authority depends
on the authority of law.7G His divine authority as the vicar of
God is not an argument for unlimited or uncontrollable author-
ity, but an additional reason for his submission to the law and
for governing according to law, which sets a bridle to his power."
It seems therefore fairly certain that the principle that the
king is such only if he administers justice according to law
and that he himself is bound to the rule of law is an elementary
principle of the medieval theory of government. Political
speculation and controversy were rife from the eleventh to the
thirteenth centuries, so that there is no lack of evidence from
which to draw conclusions as to the political thought of the time.
One of the distinctive conceptions of the medieval period seems
to be the difference between the king who obeys the law.- and who
therefore can properly claim to rule and exact obedience from
S4See quotations in 3 CARLLE, op. cit. sutpra note 29, at 65.
75 BRACTON, op. cit. supra note 66, III, 7, 1, fol. 105, quoted in 3 CIRLYLE,
op. cit. supra note 29, at 66, n. 3.
, BRACTON, op. cit. supra note 66, I, 8, 5, fol. 5. It is interesting to
observe that although Bracton quotes Theodosius' phrase from the Code
I, 14, 4, the Digiza vo:, that the Emperor's authority depends on the
authority of law, he makes no reference to the famous "legibus sohztas,"
evidently believing it unsuitable to his purpose. DIGEST I, 3, 31.
77BRAcOToN, op. cit. supra note 66, 1I, 9, 3, fol. 107 b. On the other
hand, Bracton also states that a complaint against the king can only be
made by way of supplication to him, for no writ runs against the king,
and if he will not correct what is complained of, he must be left to the
judgment of God. Ibid. I, 8, 5, fol. 5b, quoted in 3 C,=RYLE, op. cit.
supra note 29, at 70. Yet Bracton concludes this passage by saying that
while the king has no equal in administering justice, in receiving justice he
is like the humblest in his kingdom. The passage in BImcroz, op. cit.
supra note 66, 11, 16, 3, fol. 34, to the effect that the counts and barons in
the king's court are his associates, and he who has an associate has a
master, and that if the king should be without a bridle, i. e., without law,
they should impose a bridle on him, is regarded by Dr. Woodbine as an
interpolation in Bracton's text. Cf. 1 LI1TLANID, BnmcroN's NoTE-Box
(1887) 28 et. seq.; Bracton (1 Woodbine's ed. 1915) 252, 332; 3 CnLYLr,
op. cit. supra note 29, at 72. Carlyle thinks that whatever the source,
Bracton would not have repudiated the words, for his general thesis
maintains that the king is under the law, and that the Univcrjita Regni
and the Baronagiun could correct the king's unjust action. Bnuwcro., op.
cit. supra note 66, IV, 10, 7, cited in 3 CARLYLE, op. cit. sutpra note 29, at 73.
Carlyle adds that the words represented the thought of the time.
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his subjects, and the unjust ruler or tyrant who violates the law
and to whom his subjects are therefore under no obligations.1 8
It may well have happened that a tyrant, so-called, might oc-
casionally have compelled the obedience of unwilling subjects by
violence and cruelty, but this was regarded as contrary to law
and to his oath, and to evidence merely the power of physical
force occasionally to set aside the reign of law. Theory and
tradition were clearly against sustaining the legitimacy, legality
or propriety of such authority, and one gets the impression that
it was not common. Carlyle suggests that the distinction between
legal and just authority and violent and unjust power, was well
recognized even among the strongest upholders of the royal or
imperial authority, who drew upon St. Gregory " for their view
of the divine and therefore presumably uncontrollable power of
the ruler. The latter view was exceptional and found little sup-
port in practice. 0 To medieval writers like John of Salisbury,
one of the most important, the authority of the law and State
is the authority of justice and reason, and no ruler is deemed
legitimate unless he obeys the law. The supremacy of law over
7, CARLYLE, op. cit. supra note 29, c. 5; WOLZENDORFF, op. cit. supra note
71, c. 1.
79Supra, at 1056.
80 Carlyle quotes JOHN OF SALISBURY in "POLICRATICUS" (about 1155)
IV, 1, as perhaps the most important medieval writer on contemporary
political theory. The meaning of "PoLICRATICUS" is not clear. It has been
called "THE STATESmAN'S BOOK." For the several possible meanings and
an analysis of the work, see POOLE, ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE HISTORY OF
MEDIAEVAL THOUGHT (2d ed. 1920) 176, 190 et. seq. John declared, after
stating the traditional difference between prince and tyrant, that the
prince obeys the law and governs according to law and the tyrant does
not. The will of the prince is never contrary to justice. While his
authority is derived from God, he concludes that the authority of the prince
depends upon the law, and "that it is a thing greater than empire to sub-
mit the princely authority to the laws." 3 CARLYLE, op. cit. supra note
29, at 137 et seq. In explaining the phrase that the prince's will has the
force of law, John of Salisbury says that this is not because he may do
unjust things, but because his character should be such that he follows
equity and serves the commonwealth, for love of justice. The prince may
not desire anything but what law and equity and the common good require;
his will in these matters has indeed the force of law, but only because it
in no way departs from equity. Ibid. 139. Carlyle suggests that John of
Salisbury is evidently concerned to find a fair meaning for such phrases as
that the prince is legibus solutus and quod principi placuit legis habot
vigorem, inasmuch as these phrases had apparently been used to defend
the conception that the prince was not subject to law and that even his
capricious desires might override the law. John of Salisbury considered
these conceptions preposterous and impossible. John suggests that to with-
draw the prince from the authority of law is to make him an outlaw, i. c., a
person to whom all legal obligations cease. Ibid. 140; 4 ibid. c. 2; of.
DUNNING, op. cit. supra note 19, at 186-187.
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kingly authority, and obedience to law as the only justification
for such authority, is the keynote of medieval political theory.51
Bartolus, the great postglassator, writing in the fourteenth
century, had a high regard for the theoretical omnipotence of
the emperor. Though his authority was in fact denied in many
parts of Europe, Bartolus considered the Roman law as binding
and superior to all local laws and statutes, for de ju'e he con-
ceived all Europe as still incorporated in the Roman Empire.
Yet the legal omnipotence of this powerful emperor was limited,
Bartolus admitted, by law. Not only the emperor, but his own
laws, the ]us commzne et bnperiale, and all other human lavs,
are dependent upon higher laws, the jus divinmi, the jus iwtzirale
and the jus genthn. And with reference to the clause lcgibus
solutits, although the Emperor submits to his own laws "de vohea-
tate" and not "de 2zecessitate", it is still "'acqu za ct dignuim" that
he should be bound by them. Compacts he is bound to observe
by the jus gentuim. 2
5 1 John of Salisbury maintained that a tyrant has no rights against the
people and may rightfully be slain. 3 CARLYn., op. cit. supia note 29, at
143; PooLE, op. cit. supra note S0, at 208; WOLzENDOrPF, 6p. cit. osuzpa
note 71, at S. ThD right of resistance against oppression is firmly main-
tained by the individualist school of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. The French Declaration of Rights of 1789 characterized it as
among "the natural and indefeasible rights of man." Duguit, op. cit.
supra note 26, at 19. See also Declaration of 1793, arts. 27, !:2-05; LFENz,
FRAxZ6SISCHE STAATSLEHREN I 17. U 13. JAHRInUNDERT (1925) 26 ct. ckq.5 2 3BARTOLUS on CODEX, pt. 1 (C. I, 14, 4) 87; WVOOLF, op. cit. supoe note 40,
at 45-46. See also quotation from the same work in Zane, A Loga He'cscj
(1919) 13 ILL. L. Ray. 431, at 454 to the effect that the prince cannot talhe
away unjustly my control over my property, because he has no authority to
do wrong. This cannot even be done by a law of the State, says Bartolus.
BARTOLUS, op. cit. svpra pt. 1 (C. I, 22, 6) 112, § 2; WOOLF, op. Mit. opra
note 40, at 46.
Another fourteenth century publicist, Marsigio (d. 1342), interested in
supporting the authority of the emperor as necessary to maintain order,
nevertheless insists on popular sovereignty, regards the legIclcaot as the
people, and the executive, including the monarch, as the pars 'ineipsw .
The latter's authority, as in the Roman theory, if not in the practice, was
limited; he could be punished by the hgislator for violations of law.
DEFENSOR PAciS, bk. 1, c. 18, analyzed in DUNNING, 0). Cit. cu:p'a note
19, at 240. See also EMERTON, THE DEMNSOR PACIS (1920) 27 ct. -cq.
William of Ockham (d. 1349?), in the same century, much like Bartoluz,
while regarding the emperor or any other monarch as bound by the jus
naturale and the j]s gcntimui, says of the positive laws enacted by the
emperor or monarch himself, that he is not bound by them of necessity,
but propriety requires that he respect them. This is the construction placed
on the phrase, Imperator legibs solutzs. See citation to DVL. oas
mentioned by DUNNING, op. cit. sipia, at 243; Perry's ed. of Trevisa's
translation (1925) 2, 12 et seq. Both Marsiglio and Oc am adhere to a
conception of limited sovereignty. GramR, POLITIC,,L THEOrIE, (31ait-
land's transl.) 35 and notes. Prof. Dunning adds: "Throughout all the
centuries down to the eighteenth, limitation was presumed in all the thinl:-
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In the fifteenth century, Fortescue, in his famous work on the
laws of England, written to instruct the young prince of Lan-
caster, states that English law does not sanction the Roman
maxim, quod principi placuit habet legis vigorem, or anything
like it, for while in a political sense the king rules over his
people, "fie is bound to the observance of the laws" as he swears
at his coronation.8 3
We may say, then, that medieval political theory, evidencing
a natural evolution from earlier times, emphasized as constitu-
tional doctrines the principle of the equality and freedom of man,
the conviction of the sanctity of the political order, the prin-
ciple of the supremacy of the law or custom of the community,
and the idea of the king as responsible under the law and bound
to govern according to law. Whatever defects there may have
been in the practical administration of these principles, they
nevertheless manifest a cultural tradition in which the concep-
tion of sovereignty as irresponsible power can find no serious
support. Machiavelli, Bodin and Hobbes indicted polemics in
advocacy of absolutism, which even when written reflected no
existing political fact. Efforts to act on such absolutist theories
not only proved impractical to monarchy, but elped to revive
the historical doctrines of equality, natural rights and the rule
of law which lie at the foundation of modern democracy.
The Individualist Theory. The approach to more modern
times displays a growing aversion to absolutist theories. In
England, the reaction from the Restoration of 1661 which led
to the Revolution of 1688, and, in France and America, a reaction
against an oppressive monarchy produced political theories which
led to the promotion of the rights of the individual against the
State and necessarily, to constitutional limitations on the power
of the sovereign. That these attacks on the actual power of
the sovereign still left the theory of sovereignty-now usually
popular sovereignty-so largely immune, is a manifestation of
the dominance of metaphysics and of abstract conceptions in
human thought.
The conceptions through which the individualist school, whose
views both in politics and economics perhaps still dominate the
existing order, reached its goal were the doctrines of the law
of nature and the social contract.84 The conception of the law
ing about an ultimate point of authority in the State, and was lost sight of
by certain theorists only through an irrational striving after mathematical
exactness in a science which is not exact." DUNNING op. cit. supra, at 250.
83 FORTESCUE, DE LAUDIBus LEGUi ANGLIAE (Amos ed. 1825) c. 34 (Amos'
transl. 1775). See the critical note by Amos, page 125, in which he dis-
cusses the curious meanings attributed to the Roman maxim by Bracton,
Fleta and others. Amos, on the authority cited, denies the sweeping in-
terpretation sometimes given to the maxim.
84 G-TTELL, op. cit. supra note 5, at 216, 261; Duguit, op. cit. supra note
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of nature had experienced many vicissitudes since Greek and
Roman days. From its antithesis to the law of the Greek city
to its identification by the Stoics with the moral law and by
the Romans and others with the jus gentihm, or with the law of
God, it became in the seventeenth century the rule of reason, a
connotation, historically and socially interpreted, which it still
has in the due process clause of American constitutions. Grotius
stressed this interpretation of natural law; and its application
to the State, as exemplified notably by Locke, was emphasized
in the obligation to protect the so-called natural rights of man,
rights which he was deemed to possess as a human being anterior
to his assumed voluntary association with other men in organized
society.-' This was, of course, an unhistorical postulate, but it
served to deduce a political structure of society centered around
the rights of the individual and a State designed to secure them.
The French Declaration of Rights of 1789 asserted that "the
end of all political association is the conservation of the natural
and indefeasible rights of man."
It is interesting to observe that Hobbes and Locke, whose
conclusions were so sharply opposed, both postulated a state of
nature and a social contract.s But whereas Hobbes saw in
nature a condition of strife and violence which men agreed to
terminate by vesting unlimited authority in a sovereign whom
it was unlawful to resist-an unsuccessful effort to sustain ab-
solutism by a social contract -Locke regarded the state of
26, at 10, 27 et seq. The social contract theory, which took many forms,
made its appeal for a variety of reasons-as a contrast to the doctrine of
divine right, as a method of limiting arbitrary royal authority, as a basis
for rational instead of theological interpretation, as a justification of the
conscious human will in the evolution of society, and because it promoted
the claims of the individual as the essential factor in society. See Rousseau's
theory of the social contract, infra, note 88; ef. LICIIT=,;BErc, DEVlLOP-
MENT OF SOCIAL THEORY (1924) c. 8. After Rousseau, the theory of the
social contract survived in Germany and in America, in the writings of
Kant and Fichte, who tested laws by an assumed popular consent, and in
the Declaration of Independence and the writings of Jefferzon and
Madison.
85 See the learned exposition of these theories in 4 GinxE, DAs DuEu'cu
GENOSSENSCHAFTSRECHT (1913) §§ 16, 17, 18.
86 COKER, op. cit. supra note 21, c. 14, 16, quoting from HOuSES op. Cit.
supra note 31, and LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GO VERNMENT (1690) bk. 2, c. 2,
7 (Everyman's ed. 118, 154). DUNNING, POLITICAL THEORIES Om Lu HEnI
TO MONTESQUIEU (1919) c. 8, 10; GOOCH, HisRony OF ENGLISH DE,ocr Tic
IDEAS IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY (1893) c. 10; GRAHA.l, Er;GLIS
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY FROM HOBBES TO IAINE (1900) 5047; LAmrrZEcnT,
THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE (1918) bk. I, c. 1;
ibid. bk. III, c. 1, 2; LASKI, POLITIcAL THOUGHT FROM LOCKE TO BENTHAm
(1920) c. 1-2; POLLOCK, op. cit. mpra note 35, at 30, 102; WILLOUGHBY,
NATURE OF THE STATE (1896) 62-79.
erriam, Hobbes' Doctrine of the State of Nature (1906) 3 PaocEE-
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nature as one of simplicity, peace and reason, much like Rous-
seau, 8  and the political association-not a single sovereign-as
vested by agreement with a limited authority to assure to the
individual the protection of his natural rights to life, liberty
and property. The divine right of kings and of the "govern-
mental contract" between people and king, rooted in feudalism,
were repudiated by both Hobbes and Locke, whose "social con-
tract" was deemed one among peoples. In Locke, as in certain
INGS OF AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASS'N 151. Spinoza shared Hobbes'
view of the state of nature as the rule of the stronger over the weaker.
TRACTATUS THEOLOGICO-POLITICUS, c. 16; GIERKE, op. cit. supra note 85, at
380. Yet he differs from Hobbes in believing sovereignty never absolute,
and that while the sovereign power might not be bound by the civil law,
it was bound by the natural law. POLLOCK, SPINOZA, His LIFE AND PHILOS-
OPHY (2d ed. 1899) c. 10; DUFF, SPINOZA'S POLITICAL AND ETHICAL
PHILOSOPHY (1903) c. 12, 19, 22.
88 Rousseau, though a strong individualist, who also presupposed natural
man free and independent and endowed at birth with certain natural
rights, nevertheless conceived of the group as the dictator of the relation-
ship. By the "social contract" man surrenders a part of his natural in-
dependence, but in return acquires a guaranty of his rights. But the
sovereign, now the people, determines the extent of the rights surrendered
and retained. This is quite a different conception from that of Locke.
Both Locke and Rousseau agreed on popular sovereignty, but Locke con-
ceived it as passive,' exercisable only in extreme cases of revolution, what
we would now call political sovereignty, whereas Rousseau conceived it as
active, as the source of the expression of the "general will" of the peopio
through their agents, the government, in law-making. Duguit, op. cit. svpra
note 26, at 27; GETTELL, op. cit. supra note 5, at 261; DUNNING, HISTORY
OF POLITICAL THEORIES, ROUSSEAU TO SPENCER (1920) 27. Rousseau seeks
to reconcile the contradiction which he himself posits between the naturally
free man and the limitless sovereignty of the State vested in the people.
His argument was that the sovereign will is exerted by individuals (the
general will) against themselves, to the extent deemed necessary. By
the operation of the social contract, which creates the general will, the
individuals, obeying this collective will, obey only themselves. There is
a certain sophistry in this. In 2 CONTRAST SOCIAL (Harrington's ed. 1893),
Rousseau limits the State's claim upon the individual to those only which
serve the community. But in c. 6 and 7 of Book I he posits the unlimited
sovereign, who cannot be bound by law. He is guilty of strange contradic-
tions. Rousseau also propounded the view that the general will is always
right, a doctrine that the analytical school would approve. An act of
sovereignty is law. The prince, as a member of the State, is not above the
law. Yet the laws must be equal for everbody, otherwise they are invalid,
apparently an admitted limitation on the general will and the State. But
he also regards the State as omnipotent and sovereign power as unlimited.
The absolutist theories of Rousseau have been repudiated generally, yet
an erroneous conception of his views as an advocate of limited government
long prevailed. COKER, op. cit. supra note 28, c. 18; Dunning, Political
Theories of Jean Jacques Rousseau (1909) 24 POL. SCI. Q. 377; chapter
on "The Social Contract Theorists" in LICHTENBERGER, op. cit. supra
note 84; POLLOCK, HISTORY OF THE SCIENCE OF POLITICS (1890) 75 et. seq.;
Ritchie, Contributions to the History of the Social Contract Theory (1891)
6 POL. SCI. Q. 656; WILLOUGHBY, op. cit. supra note 86, c. 5.
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of his forerunners, government was founded on popular consent.
Like practically all the individualists, Locke regarded the legis-
lature as an organ whose powers were limited by the natural
rights of the individual and of the community, a fact which is to-
day exemplified in constitutional states and especially in the
United States where constitutional limitations are enforced by
judicial control. The right of popular resistance to usurpation
by civil authority was deemed inherent.
The influence of Locke's theories on modern political deve-
lopment was profound. In emphasizing natural liberty and the
social compact as opposed to absolutism and divine right, he laid
the foundation for individualism. His ideas accorded with the
desires of men of the time and with the practical notions of
lawyers, economists and conservatives generally, who sought an
intellectual basis for the binding force of contract and of the
right of property to which contract led. The utilitarians, like
Paley and Bentham,"' sought to reconcile these individual pri-
vileges with the claims of society, the greatest happiness of
the greatest number. Rousseau expanded Locke's social con-
tract into the "general will". In both cases, the equilibrium and
adjustment between individual well-being and social good is
explained by emphasis on the doctrine of equality, though it be
derived from a state of nature, as in Rousseau, from the will
of God, as in the early churchmen and in Paley, or from a mathe-
matical law of indifference, as in Bentham. The philosophy of
the early nineteenth century, the apothesis of laisscz-fa he, per-
ceived a natural and divine harmony between private advantage
and the public good. Laissez-faifre, the non-interference of
government with private initiative, the merits of free competi-
tion, the Darwinian conception of the survival of the fittest,
Spencer's organic conception of societal evolution and the limited
State, rounded out that individualist conception which lies at the
foundation of the prevailing modern political and social theory P3
89 Bentham (1748-1832) was the intellectual leader of English utilitarian-
ism. He argued that man had no duty to abstractions, such as State and
Church, but only to other human beings. He attacked Blackstone's pom-
pous generalizations in his anonymous FnAGMEuT ON GOvaIr.mNT (Mon-
tague's ed. 1891). He denied the theory of the social contract, asserting
that the State was based on a habit of obedience. It existed because of it-
obvious utility. Bentham also denied the existence of natural law and
natural rights. Like Austin, he viewed law as the expression of the
"sovereign will" of a political society in the form of a command. Indi-
viduals had no legal rights against this authority. GErELL, op. cit. mrnpza
note 5, at 342-344; ATKINSON, JEMMAY BE'THAM (1905); DANvMSO,
PoLITIc.&L THOUGHT IN ENGLAND, THE UTniTALk.%Ns FonI BErNTIMA TO)
DImL (1915)c. 1; DICEY, LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION IN ENG",-D (2d el
1914) 125 et seq.; POLLOCK, op. cit. supra note SB, at 93 et -cq.; Wallas,
Jeremy Bentham (1923) 38 POL. SCI. Q. 45.
90 See the brilliant essay of John Maynard Keynes, The End of Laifwz-
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That these are essentially hypotheses, founded on certain pre-
conceptions of private and public good, is not always perceived.
The nineteenth and the twentieth centuries with their industrial
revolution and organization of society have developed challenges
to the complacent hypotheses of the extreme individualists; and
modern social and political struggle centers about the assumed
conflict between individual and social advantage-for the two
are no longer regarded as in the long run necessarily identical.
The result, in the widening of the social vision, has been an en-
largement in governmental enterprise and an ever greater social
control in the form of police power legislation. 1 Our study as
Faire (1926) 48 THE NEw REPUBLIC, No. 612, Aug. 25, 1926, p. 13; ibid.
No. 613, Sept. 1, 1926, p. 37. See Dunning's generalization that "Milton
had excluded government from interference with the citizen's expression
of opinion, Locke had excluded it from interference with the citizen's
material property, Voltaire and a host of others had excluded it from
interference with his religious worship, the Physiocrats and economists
had excluded it from interference with his industrial and commercial life."
Op. cit. supra note 88, at 153. On the theory of individualism, political
and economic, and the views of some of its major exponents, see GETTELL,
op. cit. supra note 5, at 371-374; BASU, op. cit. supra note 35, Lectures 2
and 3; BROWN, UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES OF MODERN LEGISLATION, (3d ed.
1914) c. 6; RATIONAL BASIS OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS (1923) 1-51 (Lais-
sez-faire), 52-91 (Competition); DUNNING, op. cit. supra note 88, at 395. On
solidarity of interests of society and individual, see JHERING, LAW AS A
MEANS TO AN END (1913) 415.
91 The reaction against laissesz-faire, which was held responsible for
destitution and economic oppression, was expressed in a demand for greater
state control, a renewed faith in the State, an abandonment of the me-
chanistic conception of free individuals and a "social contract". The State
determined how far individual freedom was consistent with social well-
being. Ethics and politics were not deemed inconsistent, but one. The
main champions of this idealist conception are to be found in Germany and
England. Not all abandoned the social contract as a conception. The
Doctrinaires in France, led by Royer Collard (1763-1845), influenced by
the German idealists like Kant and Fichte, worked out the compromise
between monarchy and people and between society and the individual, by
emphasizing the sovereignty of reason, which admitted the claims of both.
GETTELL, op. cit. supra note 5, at 359.
Kant (1724-1804) distinguished innate rights and acquired rights of
the individual. The latter alone he owed to the State. The social con-
tract is the basis of the State, and Kant follows Rousseau in holding that
the omnipotence of the State does not exclude the liberty of the individual.
The sovereignty of the State, as in Rousseau, manifests itself through law.
But Kant's State, unlike Rousseau's, is divine, because irreproachable,
i. e., infallible, and because people cannot inquire into its origin. People
must always obey government. The supreme power in the State has only
rights and no duties toward the subject. But see BROWN, THE AUSTINIAN
THEORY OF LAW (1906) 194; WENZEL, JURISTISCHE GRUNDPROBLEIIE (1920)
209; Borchard, op. cit. supra note 2, at 787, n. 79. The executive's func-
tions are, however, deemed limited. Yet the executive power is irresistible
and cannot be disobeyed. Limited monarchy was an inconsistency. A po-
litical constitution was an expedient to present an illusion of popular rights,
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but it was not a legal limitation. Yet, we might suggest, political limita-
tions it clearly embodied, and their denial as legal is mainly verbal. In
a constitutional State, said Kant, revolution is illegitimate, yet if revolution
succeeds and establishes a government, it must be obeyed. Duguit, who thus
analyzes Kant, fails to point out that Kant was dealing at once with an
ideal and with a practical State, and was inevitably led into confusion.
Op. cit. supra note 26, at 40-56. His ideal State was formed by voluntary
agreement and its sovereignty was derived from the will of all the people,
where men were free and equal, forming the State by a constitution. His
practical State, derived from historical conditions, was based on force
and reason, its sovereignty resting with those who had the actual power.
GETTELL, op. cit. supra note 5, at 315; see KANT, MlErApnYSiScnE ANFaGs-
GRUNDE DER RECHTSLEHRE (1796) (Hastie's transl. 1887, under the title
KANT'S PHILOSOPHY OF LAW); Dunning, The Political Theoric. of the
German Idealists (1913) 28 POL. ScI. Q. 193, 480 and op. cit. supra note 88,
c. 4; KANT, PRINCIPLES o POLITICS (Hastie's transl. 1891); BcnoLzuuIiwn,
op. cit. supra note 6, at 180.
Fichte (1762-1814) in his GRUNDLAGE DES NATURIiECHTS (1796)
(Kroeger's transl. 1869, under the title THE SCIENCE OF RIGHTS) empha-
sized the rights of the individual and the sovereignty of the people, though
he later advocated a wide authority of the State. For the maintenance of
the constitution against invasion by government he suggested the creation
of a board of Ephors or supervisors, as a check on government. Gui-ELL,
op. cit. supra note 5, at 318; DUNNING, op. cit. supra note 88, at 137, 147;
BEROLZHEI~MR, op. cit. svpra note 6, at 192.
Hegel (1770-1831) carried to an extreme the curious dogma of Rousseau
that the more powerful the State the greater the freedom of the individual.
He conceived the individual and society both as antithesis and synthesis,
the individual realizing himself in the State. GRUNLiNIEN DER PHILOSOPHIE
DES RECHTS (1821) (Dyde's transl. 1S96, under the title HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY
OF RIGHT). Hegel rejects the social contract. To him, there is something
divine about the State. Yet Hegel's prince was a constitutional monarch.
To Hegel the State was a natural organism, not a collection of separate
individuals each possessing natural rights and a share of the general will
or sovereignty. It was to him a real person; sovereignty resided in it, not
in the people. It found its expression in the monarch, who perzonified
the State. The political philosophy of Kant and Hegel and their schools
was based on pure and abstract thought, rather than on observation and
experience. To them the will was the ultimate element in politics. But at
all times, the glorification of the national State found opposition in Ger-
many. See Humboldt's individualist doctrines in his IDEcN ZU Enmr VuEn-
SUCH DIE GRXNZEN DER WiRKSADKErr DES STAATS ZU BESIMuMN (1851)
(Coulthard's transl. 1854, under the title SPHERE AND DUTIES oF Go% vDN-
MENT). For a summary of Humboldt's ideas see DUNNING, op. cit. Tipra note
88, at 148, 154. On Hegel's political theory see Duguit, op. cit. supra note 26,
at 57-102; MORRIS, HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF TIE STATE AND OF HISTORY
(1887); DEWEY, GuRmAN PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS (1915); GETTELL, Gp.
cit. supra note 5, at 318-320; DUNNING, op. cit. supra note 83, at 154;
BEROLZHEIMER, op. cit. su.pra note 6, at 215.
In England several of the Oxford group, though more disposed to em-
phasize the importance of the individual, were nevertheless primarily nco-
Hegelians. The State was an end in itself, an ultimate moral being, an
organism with a personality and will of its own. Bosanquet, in particular,
in his PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY OF THE STATE (1899) c. 9, 10, adopts Hcgel's
view that the State cannot be bound by rules of individual morality, or by
any system of rights and duties. We are reminded of Hobbes and Austin.
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to whether the State should repair the injuries which its agents
inflict in the performance of public duties involves, from the
viewpoint of political theory, an examination of the balance of
private and public advantage in making or not making compen-
sation for such injuries. It is, however, proper to observe that
the individualists, whose views found expression in the constitu-
tions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, regarded the
legislature as subject to the control of law, that positive law must
heed the fundamental constitutionally protected rights of the
individual, and that the State is thus not only bound not to trans-
gress these rights of the individual, but that the State, for the
same reason, is also bound by the positive laws which it enacts.
Thus the individualists, from their postulate of the natural rights
of man, whether or not expressly embodied in constitutional pro-
visions, arrived at the conclusion that the State was limited by
its own positive laws, so long as these were in force.9 2 Neces-
See GETTELL, op. cit. supra note 5, at 321-324; BARKER, POLITICAL TiOUGHT
IN ENGLAND FRI I SPENCER TO To-DAY (1915) c. 2, 3; HOBHousE, THE
METAPHYSICAL THEORY OF THE STATE (1918); Hoernl6, Bosanquet's
Philosophy of the State (1919) 34 PoL. Sc. Q. 609; WADDINGTON, DE-
VELOPMENT OP BRITISH THOUGHT (1919) c. 2, 9, 10; cf. Rocco,-The Political
Doctrines of Fascism (Oct. 1926) INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION, No. 223.
92 Duguit, op. cit. supra note 26, at 10 et seq. Benjamin Constant was
among those who found a legal limitation upon sovereignty in the constitu-
tional rights of the individual. COURS DE POLITIQUE CONSTITUTIONELLMI
(1819); see Duguit, op. cit. supra 105. He attacked Rousseau's dogma
that the "general will" cannot err. He not only denied the alleged un-
limited power (sovereignty) of society over its members, but combatted
Rousseau's belief in the omnipotence of the majority. He denied the whole
alleged basis and terms of the social contract, and particularly denied that
the individual surrenders all his rights to the community, and that the
community and its agents cannot in theory injure its members collectively
or individually. As every organ, every societal agent, of the State was
legally limited in authority, Constant held that sovereignty must neces-
sarily be limited. In the control of the State by justice he perceived moral
limitations; in its recognition of natural and individual rights, he per-
ceived legal limitations. Constant, while admitting the necessity for a
sanction for these legal limitations, finds it in political institutions. This
may not be acceptable generally, but is possibly as convincing as Duguit's
sanction in the necessity for conformity with the principles of "social soli-
darity". Constant denies the necessity of obedience to laws transcending
the limited powers of the legislature, whereas Duguit denies the character of
law to rules defying the principles of social solidarity. How we are to
identify these "illegal" laws and how courts are to deal with them, Duguit
does not make clear. Had Constant identified his alleged legal limitations,
arising out of recognition of individual rights, with those enforced by
courts, even against the State, there could be no legitimate objection to
considering them as legal. Constant denies the character of law to retro-
active legislation, class legislation, legislation commanding acts contrary
to morals, i.e. those laws which, among others, would to-day in the United
States fall outside the limitation of "due process of law."
Esmein (1848-1913), one of the ablest jurists of modern France, posits
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sarily, also, the State is bound by its contracts with private in-
dividuals, as are individuals by their contracts ihter se, and is
bound to repair damages when it unduly or wrongfully invades
the rights of the individual, as are private individuals. The
civil law countries, not disturbed by such conceptions as kings
above the law, absolute sovereignty and other dogmatic inven-
tions, found no trouble in subjecting the State to the rules of law
whenever the State entered into relations with individuals which
could be assimilated to those relations into which other corpor-
ations might enter and which could be deemed governed by prin-
ciples of private law. The State as a fiscas in Germany, in an
activity jure gestionis in France and elsewhere, was deemed by
the courts subject to the rules of municipal law, without express
legislative consent. Difficulty and doubt arose in the extension
of the principle to the more distinctly governmental functions
of the State. The twentieth century marks the evolution of pub-
lic law so as gradually to bring within the domain of legal rules
the relation between the individual and the State in its character
as a governmental agency.
Duguit can hardly be gainsaid when he characterizes the in-
dividualist conception of the natural rights of isolated man an-
terior to his entrance into social relations as a bit of metaphysics.
Rights, natural or other, presuppose a social organization. Nor
do the natural rights of man explain the limitations on legal
sovereignty. Absolute sovereignty, however, is as much a meta-
physical conception as the natural rights of man, and its his-
torical and intellectual foundation is less solid. We do know
that in the constitutional State in the United States, the legal
system places judicially enforceable limitations on the State
and the group for the benefit of the individual and on the in-
dividual for the benefit of the group 3 The history of political
and social thought furnishes the key to the content of these limi-
the inconsistency of the State's unlimited sovereignty, limited in its cXcrfcim
by the constitutional rights of the individual. 1 Es,=wrN, tLZEW.',rS rE
DROIT CoNSTITUTIONNEL FRANCAIS (7th d. 1921) 33, 46, 50, 444. We have
already discussed this suggestion, repeated by WILOTGHY, Borchard, op.
cit. supra, note 2, at 789. Esmein, like most modern writers on constitu-
tional law, concedes that the parliamentary constitutional State is organized
to protect individual liberty and property against the encroachment of the
State (organized society).
93 These conceptions coincide with the theory of constitutional democracy
in all western countries. They were given their greatest impetus by the
ideas of the American and the French Revolutions, which promoted written
constitutions, representative government, popular sovereignty, national unity
and individual rights, with a growing development of social control through
the police power. The liberalism of the nineteenth century, reacting on
the economic doctrine of laissez faire, produced a popular conviction that
individual freedom equally promoted social welfare. Forms of government
in Europe favored the limited monarchy rather than the republic; the lat-
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tations. The existence of legal limitations in the United States
is verified by the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the federal
constitution. The denial of their legal character must be left
to the dialectics of the analytical school, founded on their ideal
and metaphysical postulates.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL STATE
Ever since the Middle Ages, political theory has been struggl-
ing with two diametrically opposed conceptions of the relation
between the State and law. The Germanic conception of the
Rechtsstaat, the State and ruler limited by law, competed with
the so-called Roman conception of the legally unlimited State and
ruler. To the aid of the former conception came, among others,
(a) the Monarchomachs of the late sixteenth century, with their
doctrines of the fiduciary and contractual origin of political au-
thority and the consequent right of popular resistance and of
ter, in modern times, has been a comparatively recent development, except
on the American continent. In Europe controversy centered about tho
power of the monarch to change the consitution, to participate in law-
making, to exercise the ordinance power. Dunning, European Theories of
Constitutional Government after the Congress of Vienna (1919) 34 POL.
ScI. Q. 1. Early American political theory was based on doctrines of natural
law and the social contract. Wright, American Interpretations of Natural
Law (1926) 20 AMA POL. Sci. REV. 524. Its principal exponents in the crea-
tive period were Jefferson, influenced largely by Locke, Otis, John and Samuel
Adams, Dickinson, Paine and Hamilton. See JEFFERSON, WoRKs (Ford ed.
1899); CLEVELAND, THE GROWTH OF DEMiIOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES
(1898); MERRIAM, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES (1920) c.
2, 4, 5; MERRIAM, AMERICAN POLITICAL IDEAS, STUDIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT (1920). It is surprising that in the
face of so markedly a democratic inspiration, which extolled the individual
and his rights against the claims of the State, that there should have de-
veloped in the United States the doctrine of State immunity from suit and
from responsibility to individuals for injuries inflicted by officers in the
operation of the State machine. That the doctrine of State immunity
prevailed, founded on an English historical maxim and supported by ab-
solutist arguments, is an illustration of the vagaries of legal history. After
Jackson's time, the theory of natural rights and the social contract began
to lose ground. It was opposed not only by Calhoun and his followers, but
also by many anti-slavery writers, like Story. Francis Lieber (1800-1872)
author of the first systematic treatises on political science published in the
United States, favored social control through a strong state, although he
-did not deny the necessity of respecting certain individual, possibly "nat-
ural" rights. He interpreted these rights differently, however, from the
eighteenth century view. LIEBER, ON CIVIL LIBERTY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT
(3rd ed. 1883) c. 2-6, 22-26; GETTELL, op. cit. supra note 5, c. 12; Mnu-
RIAM, AMERICAN POLITICAL IDEAS. . . . c. 1-3, 7-8, 11-12. On the
criticisms of democracy, see GETTELL, op. cit. supra note 5, at 366-369. On
the rise of socialistic political thought, and the reaction against individual-
ism, see GETTELL, op. cit. supra note 5, c. 23; on recent proletarian political
thought. Ibid. c. 30.
GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY IN TORT 1075
disobedience to unlawful commands,o1 (b) the defenders of popu-
lar sovereignty, (c) the eighteenth century disciples of the school
of natural law, with their renewed emphasis upon the sanctity of
vested rights and the so-called inalienable rights of man, and
finally, (d) the philosophy of democracy which gave these doc-
trines a political and constitutional framework in the modern
state. The most recent exponents of these theories postulate
what they call the "sovereignty of law," a conception presently
to be examined.
The conception of the unlimited monarchy, free from the con-
trol of law, was fostered (a) by the distinction, posited by Bar-
tolus, between communities which do and those which do not
recognize a superior, (b) by the successful efforts of the Church
and its scholastic protagonists to place the Church outside the
law, and (c) by the publicists supporting ruler sovereignty
against popular sovereignty, such as M1achiavelli, Bodin and
Hobbes, all of whom relied much on Roman maxims and insisted
that the State alone created law. Freedom from the restraint of
law was deemed an inherent characteristic of sovereignty. When,
in the late eighteenth century, the Rousseau school transferred to
the people that unlimited power which the Hobbesian school
had postulated in the ruler, and when with it natural law as a
legal system lost favor, the ground was laid for the modern analy-
tical jurist who sees in the democratic, as in the autocratic, State
that legally unlimited sovereign who cx hypothcsi creates the
law and changes it at will, and is, hence, above it. Recognizing
the existence of a constitution, he is perforce driven to assert
that its supposed limitations are not legal in character, but moral
only, because changeable by the authority that imposed them.
The doctrine of auto-limitation or self-restraint, as he calls it,
he refuses to admit as a legal restraint.
The historical antinomy between the State's postulated free-
dom from and its subjection to law, which occupied the publicists
of the Middle Ages and those of more modern times, was in a
measure reconciled by the view that the precepts of natural law
bound the State and the ruler or government, but that the rules
of positive law emanating from the State did not bind it to
any greater extent than it chose. This compromise, which plays
an important part in the evolution of the modern State, wIas
aided by several significant developments. In the first place,
the emancipation from legal restraint was claimed by the philoso-
phers for the true monarch only, not for the head of a republic.P
Again, the adherents of popular sovereignty predicated the bind-
ing character of laws on the consent of the governed and insisted
upon the subjection to law and legislation of the governing head
q4 TREUMANN, Di EIONARCHtOMACHEN (1895) c. 4.
A5 GIERKE, PoLrrIcAL THEORIES OF THE 1\IMDnrAGE (Afaitland's ed.) 77.
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of the State. The admitted distinction between legislative and
executive power proved to be highly important for the develop-
ment of the constitutional State in the eighteenth century. Leg-
islative supremacy was conceded to the popular or ecclesiastical
legislative assembly and rights flowing from legislative grant
were admitted to be of a less unchallengeable character than
those derived from natural law, which embraced now the jus
gentium, now the jus divinum and jus naturale. Finally, after
the doctrinal conflict between the emperor's supposed dominimin
of all the property in the State and his imperium or sovereign
control for the public good only-sometimes known as dominiurn
eminens-there emerged the doctrine admitting the institution
of private property as a definitely recognized human (natural)
right prior to and independent of the State.90 The ruler's or
State's privilege of expropriating this private property was
strictly limited to public purposes, ex justa caus and the pay-
ment of compensation. This admission laid the ground for the
recognition of the doctrine that there were certain natural rights
of the individual which no sovereign could impair. Some of these
rested on a supra-state natural law, some on a supposed contract
with the sovereign which, according to natural law, was binding
upon him. These so-called natural rights were not always clear,
nor were their limitations easily defined. But that they are
important is evidenced in the Declaration of Independence, in
the Declaration of the Rights of Man in France, and in the con-
stitutions of the United States and of other states of the western
world.9 7 Of these rights, that of private property occupies uni-
formly a prominent place, and it is in the constitutional limita-
tions on the right of eminent domain in France and elsewhere that
the main support was found for positing the pecuniary responsi-
bility of the State for invasions of other private rights.
We have already observed the Middle Age conception of natural
law as a set of rules binding on all earthly powers, including
sovereigns and peoples. The State itself by hypothesis owed its
existence and its legal powers to natural law. While positive law
96 GIERKE, JOHANNES ALTnUSIUS, 295 et seq. and authorities there quoted
and cited; 2 LOCKE, Two TREATISES ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT (1924) c. 2, 5
(of property); c. 7, 9, § 131; c. 11, §134; chapter on "Locke's Theory of
the State," POLLOCK, op. cit. supra note 35, at 90 et seq. Locke reflected
the ancient view of property as a "natural right" as formulated by St.
Thomas Aquinas and accepted by Grotius, Puffendorf, Wolff, and others
in -the eighteenth century; against this theory Montesquieu, Bentham, Mill
and others, following St. Augustine, contended that property was a mere
creature of positive law. RoMmu, LA PROPRItr (1923) 78-161. Cf. the
various theories of property in RATIONAL BASIS OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS, (by
various authors, 1923) pt. 2; RITCHIE, NATURAL RIGHTS (1924) c. 5, 13.
07 RITCHIE, Op. cit supra note 96, c. 1 and Appendix, 289-297; KORKUNOv,
GENERAL THEORY OF LAw (1909) c. 3.
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could amplify, modify and apply the precepts of natural law, it
could not change them08 With the growing recognition of the
sphere of the individual as an end in himself, it became estab-
lished in jurisprudence and philosophy that individual rights
which flow from natural law were equally inviolable by positive
law. If positive law did purport to violate these limitations,
legal doctrine, as early as Bartolus, regarded the statute as null
and void and the individual released from the duty to obey.
Against the effort to compel obedience, some publicists even ap-
proved armed resistance."
The supporters of absolute sovereignty 'c denied the legitimacy
of these conceptions, the historical and practical importance of
which are obvious in every modern constitutional state. These
publicists maintained the complete supremacy of the sovereign
ruler in the legal field and at most regarded the precepts of natu-
ral law as the demands of moral justice without binding force
upon the sovereign will. If they were disregarded by the
sovereign, there was no remedy and of course no privilege of
disobedience or resistance. Machiavelli shocked the publicists of
his time when he thus declared his Prince free from the re-
straints of natural law.
The history of law reflects the struggle of jurisprudence and
political theory to determine the appropriate force and place of
natural law. Its distinction from positive law is recognized
down to the nineteenth century. But the effort was frequently
made to unite the two or to find a basis for their reconciliation
in the State. Doubts arose as to the nature of positive law,
especially as to whether it was confined to legislation and recog-
nized custom, whether it was a creation or a historical growth
and adoption of natural law, whether justice or moral rightness
was a material element of law, whether force alone could
characterize a command as law, and whether enforcement by a
superior or whether a "sovereign will" were essential elements.2,"
98 See the views of Grotius. 1 DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS, c. 1, § 10; GIEIuH,
op. cit. supra note 96, at 298, and critical sunmary in HEARNSHAW, THE
SoCIAL AND POLITICAL IDEAS or SOntE GREAT THiNxERs OF THU 1GTH AND
17TH CENTURIES (1926) 145-152.
9" WOLZENDORFF, STAATSRECHT UND NATUnREHT (1916) pt. 2; GnIE.,
op. cit. supra note 96, at 305 et seq., citing authorities.
On the theory that statutes contrary to natural rights or "common law';
were void, see Coke's decision in Dr. Bonham's Case, 8 Co. 114a (C. P.
1610); Plucknett, Bonhanzs Case and Jvdicial Rcricvi (1926) 40 HAnv. L.
REv. 30. Mc ILwAIN, THE HIGH COURT OF PALYAZENT (1910) 105; c. 3,
esp. 147, and 286. Vinogradoff, Rcasmi and Conswine in Sixtecnth Cent-
ury Jurisprudence (1908) 24 L. Q. REv. 373, discussing largely ST. G=Lu.,
DocToR AND STUDENT (1523). CRUMP AND JACOB, op. cit. upra, note 05,
527.
100 GIERKE, op. cit. supra note 96 at 312 et scq.
1o GI E, ibid. 298; KORKUNOV, op. cit. supra, note 97, c. 2; MMAGLL%,
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Even where the doctrine of the sovereign will as the creator of
law prevailed, it was deemed to be limited by natural law, though
there was much difference as to whether it was of coercive or
merely directive influence. This control upon positive law led to
the eighteenth century theory of abstract reason, 102 the forerun-
ner of that "rule of reason" which guides modern courts in the
constitutional interpretation of legislation. There was doubt as
to how the ruler could be controlled and compelled by governmen-
tal machinery to remain within the bounds of law. The adher-
ents of popular sovereignty, for whom the ruler was no
sovereign, insisted on the power of control, just as the Mon-
archomachs had held even the people bound by positive law.
Some undertook to free the sovereign only from the civil law, not
from the constitutional laws. Yet Bodin and his school, who
refused to recognize any such distinction, strengthened by theory
the actual claims of many monarchs to absolute and unlimited
power, and, by insisting that any limitations on sovereignty
destroyed sovereignty itself, were able to defeat at certain
periods the arguments of the protagonists of limited power.
These divergent streams of theory found something like a com-
mon mouth in the jurists who concluded that the leges funda-
mentales were not properly laws, but contracts between ruler and
ruled, which by natural law were unequivocally binding on the
ruler. Grotius was an eminent representative of this group. He
announced the important proposition, which has indelibly influ-
enced western public law, that the sovereign's freedom from the
civil laws was a fact only in his character as a sovereign, but that
acts undertaken as a private person, made the ordinary private
law applicable to him. 10 3 While this doctrine exercised influ-
ence, the lack of enforcing machinery for any constitutional
restraints led to its characterization as obligatio imperfecta.114
When then there arose the belief that the constitutional contract
could be breached ex causa, that salus publica was causa, and
that the ruler was the judge of the public weal, not much more
than an appeal to the conscience of the ruler was left of con-
stitutional limitations. The supporters of the legal State con-
centrated their attack on the excessive extension of the salus
COmPARATIVE LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (1921) c. 7, 8, 10; LgVY-ULLMANN, ELE-
MIENTS D' INTRODUCTION GENERALE. . . . LA DEFINITION DuI) DR=
(1917) pts. 1, 3; SOML6, JURISTICHE GRUNDLEHRE (1917) §§ 17, 41;
JENKS, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE AGES (1913) 3.
102 The doctrine reached its apotheosis in Kant. cf. Duguit, op. cit. supra
note 26; GIERKE, op. cit. supra note 96, at 304.
103 2 GROTIUS, op. cit. supra note 98, e. 14, §§ 1, 2.
104 PUFFENDORF, DE JURE NAT. Er GENT. (Kennett's ed. 1703) VII, c. 5, § 8,
and other authorities cited in GiERKE, op. cit. supra note 96, at 287 ct seq.
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publica or against the ruler's power to constitute himself the
exclusive judge of its scope.1°0
The attention of the adherents of both absolute and limited
power was thus directed to the determination of the nature
and binding character of natural law. The promoters of popular
sovereignty, like Milton and Locke, were led to abandon the
doctrine of the Monarchomachs that the people were bound by
law, like the ruler, and instead raised the so-called sovereign
popular will above all positive law, including constitutions,
though all governmental agents were deemed bound by law.
Actually, this forced popular sovereignty into an absolute mould,
the ultimate consequences of which Rousseau drew. The con-
cession left an agreement that sovereignty was unlimited, leaving
open only the question as to where this unlimited power resided.
But the constitution was deemed binding on state agents of every
description, including rulers. These political theorists were
unconsciously laying the foundation for the modern distinction
between political and legal sovereignty, but obscured that dis-
tinction and created confusion. Their contribution lay in giving
the constitution binding force, subject to the sanction of active
resistance, and in erecting for every state, on the foundation of
natural law, a tacit constitution by which, under all circum-
stances, the najestas or ruling power was bound, to the same
extent as by express contract, to respect and safeguard the rights
of individuals. Locke's legislature was limited by the constitu-
tion, and even his people, though above the constitution, were
deemed bound by the rights of the individual.00
The bridge to the modern constitutional state was supplied
by the doctrine of separation of powers. Confined by Montes-
quieu to a reciprocal limitation of the powers inter se, it developed
later into a limitation upon the State (the organized people)
and its agencies. Though long familiar with the separation of
the legislative and executive power, it was only in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries that there developed fully the distinc-
tion between the executive and the judicial power, and notably
the doctrine that the executive or administrative power was
subject to judicial control. 1' 7  Judicial control for the protection
of the individual replaced physical resistance in the theory of
the supporters of the legal state, and its growth in the nine-
teenth century evidences the development of the legal and con-
stitutional State. In the United States this judicial control
extends even to legislative acts, but by a strange historical quip
lo5 GwRnu, ibid. 288.
'o, LocKE op. cit. svpra note 96, c. 11, §§ 13C-141. On the varying con-
ceptions of natural law, in history and at the present time, see the literature
cited svpra, note 35.
107 Cf. Fairlie, The Scparation of Powers (1923) 21 BMicH. L. Rcv. 393.
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its control over administrative acts falls short of enabling
pecuniary compensation to be obtained by the individual from
the State for tortious injuries arising out of a defective or il-
legal operation of the public service.
Judicial Control. The transition from the absolute to the
constitutional or legal State 'vas very gradual. In all countries,
it probably consisted first in diminishing the royal prerogative
by transferring to parliamentary institutions control over general
legislation. Down to the nineteenth century, however, notwith-
standing the increasing constitutional protection for acquired or
vested rights, the ruler and executive in most monarchical
countries had an important residuum of dispensing power, which
escaped legal control. It was the contribution of the nineteenth
century to diminish this dispensing and ordinance power to
narrow limits. Even where the king or ruler was left with a
certain measure of prerogative, it was largely personal in nature.
In democratic states the exercise of the so-called political powers
of the executive, which escapes judicial control, is nevertheless
subjected to popular control at the polls. But other executive
and administrative boards and officers are kept within the bounds
of their jurisdiction and powers by judicial control.
The jurists of the school of natural law in the eighteenth
century helped to effect this change on the continent. It was
manifested in the change from what is known as the legally un-
controlled or police State (Polizei-Staat) to the so-called legally
or judicially controlled or "legal" State (Rechtstaat).1°  The
term "legal State" has been used in three different senses: (a)
as the opposite of the absolute State. For this conception and
final result the school of natural law, notably Althusius,
Puffendorf, Locke, Kant and Humboldt, are largely responsible;
it is marked by the limitation of the functions of the State to the
administration of justice and the adjustment of the relations
between the governors and the governed by law; (b) the consti-
tutional State, in which the form and content of government is
determined by representatives of the people; (c) the subjection
of the government and administration to the statute and to
1081 MAYER, DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSRECHT (3rd ed. 1924) 38, 54; HAT-
SCHEK, LEHRBUCH DES DEUTSCHEN U. PREUSSISCHEN VERIVALTUNGSRECHTS
(3rd ed. 1924) §§ 1, 3; GNEIST, DER RECHTSSTAAT (1872) 6, 39; BXHRI, DE l
RECHTSSTAAT (1864); 1 STEIN, VERWALTUNGSLEHRE (2d ed. 1869) 297;
SCHUBLE, DIE LEHRE VOm RECHTSSTAAT IN GESCHICHTLICIIER DARSTELLUNG
(1925) (Tibingen dissertation); GRAZiANO, Lo STATO GiuiwRco (1919) In-
troduction and c. 1; 2 DUGUIT, DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL (2d ed. 1923) c. 3.
By Duguit, the "rule of law" binding on the State is conceived as indepen-
dent of the State, a creation of the social conscience and binding on all
persons in the State, including governors and governed. Ibid. 90; ci. Vino-
gradoff, The Juridical Nature of the State (1924), 23 Mica. L. REv. 138, at
148.
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judicial control, with administrative discretion limited or to some
extent reviewable.1O These are general principles and few con-
crete problems are solved by them. Yet the development of the
"rule of law", a notable feature as a world phenomenon of the
nineteenth century, marks a definite transition from the abso-
lutistic conceptions of the seventeenth century in favor of the
guaranteed protection of the individual against undue encroach-
ment by the government or by the group.
In England, this development begins as far back as Magna
Carta and is marked by such stages as the Petition of Right,
the Habeas Corpus Act, the Bill of Rights and the Act of Settle-
ment. The main standard of protection of the individual against
the administration lay in the judicium oarium and per legcin
terrae exercised and interpreted by the courts. Though the king
was theoretically the head of all branches of the government, the
system of ministerial responsibility to parliament, the growing
personal responsibility of officers in tort before the regular
courts, the effective independence of the courts and a large
measure of self-government, with constitutional safeguards
politically protected, served to keep all branches of the adminis-
tration within legal bounds.-10 The development of the jurisdic-
tion of the justice of the peace, with appeals to the judges of
assize and later to the Privy Council and the King's Bench,
was an important factor in this extension of judicial control.
In France the constitutional recognition of the separation of
powers, and the development, after 1793, of independent judicial
and administrative courts, building up a case-law with ever-
growing protection for the rights of the individual against
invasion by administrative acts, served the same purpose. In
Central Europe, without any openly admitted doctrine of the
separation of powers, there developed gradually the rules that the
administration was bound by its own decision, which had to be
regularly published, that the ordinance power was strictly
limited by law and legislation, and that individual rights were
to be guaranteed by the creation of a widespread system of
administrative courts. Not that the individual was without
protection in the so-called "police State". The Prussian civil
code of 1754 had placed the territorial ruler as a private person
under the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts, governed by the
common law, though the judicial channel was of no avail against
the exercise of so-called "sovereign" powers-what the French
10' STIER-SO'LO, JUSTrZ UN VERWALTUNG in 1 HANDBrC DMR PoIrrIX
(3rd ed. 1920) 299; see also ibid. 49, 97; STEIN, GPlENzEN U-N'D BEZIECUNG
ZWISCHEN JUTSTIZ UND VERWALTUNG (1912) §§ 2, 8, 13; MAYER, JUSTIZ UND
VERWALTUNG (1902).
110 ADAMS, THE ORIGIN OF THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION (1912) 157 ct Geq.
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call "actes de gouvemement".111 Moreover, it was possible to sue
the territorial ruler or State before the ordinary courts when
acting in the capacity as a fiseus engaged in corporate acts and as
an owner of property, or when failing to pay in eminent
domain.112
In France and Germany, as contrasted with England, the
criterion of the legal State was the separation of the administra-
tion from the judiciary. In pre-revolutionary France the old
independent parliaments (courts) had deemed themselves pro-
tectors of the legal order and sought to keep the king's officials
within their judicial supervision. One of the first results of the
constitutions following the Revolution was to deny the courts any
power to intervene in the administration.,, Administrative
jurisdiction was created as a power co-equal with the judiciary,
and to this day the Conseil d'Etat exercises jurisdiction over
suits against the State arising out of injuries inflicted upon
individuals in the administration of the public service. In Ger-
many, the separation took a somewhat different direction. Not
only were the administration brought within legal forms and
administrative courts created to insure legality," 4 but the demand
arose for the extension to public, or sovereign, or governmental
acts that same regulation and control by law that already
existed in the case of private law or corporate acts of the State
(fiscus)."1 This has largely been accomplished by legislation
in 1909 and 1910, and particularly in the Constitution of 1919,
to an extent not yet known in other countries.'" In France the
Council of State by its decisions has broadened greatly the
conception of actes de gestion, private and public, and corre-
spondingly narrowed the conception of actes de gouvernement,
sovereign.acts. But judicial control is exercised in Germany over
acts of the adminstration both in administrative and ordinary
courts. Both, in practice, have been independent of the execu-
tive. Appeals by individuals challenging the legality or correct-
ness of administrative acts go to the administrative courts, but
suits against officers and against the State for compensation,
go as of old to the ordinary courts. When, therefore, Dicey
extolled the English "rule of law" as affording the individual
IL 2ALLGEMEINS LANDRECHT (Koch's 8th ed. 1884-6) § 17, II, 13; § 18, II,
13, quoted in HATSCHEK, supra note 108, at 2.
112HATSCHEK, op. cit. supra note 108, at 3; MAYER, op. cit. supra note
108, at 49 et seq.; VON FRISCH, VERANTWORTLICHKEIT DER MONARCHEN, 109
et seq.
113 MAYER, THEORIE DES FRANZOSISCHEN VERWALTUNGSBECHT (1886) 87
et seq.
214 HATSCHEK, op. cit. supra note 108, § 3; MAYER, op. cit. supra note 108,
at 60.
12 BEXR, op. cit. supra note 108, at 54, 57.
111 German Constitution of 1919, art. 131.
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protection against official wrongdoing by suits against officers
before the ordinary courts, and correspondingly deprecated the
weak protection afforded by French and German administrative
law to the injured individual, because this was not deemed to
assure a reliable and independent application of law, he was not
very accurate.117  Although he modified his views in later
editions 118 and finally admitted that the French Cozscil dtEtat
was in actual effect as independent as any other court and gave
broad protection to the individual, he seems to have misconceived
the German law, which controls the administrative act by re-
course to administrative courts, independent as any other
courts, but permits suit against the officer and State before the
ordinary courts to an extent unknown in England. Professor
Morgan is authority for the statement that Dicey did not
adequately take account of the privileged and exceptional posi-
tion which the officer, who in most tort cases is alone suable,
occupies in the English courts.110 Such an exceptional position
he does not enjoy in either France or Germany.
In the United States, officers may be sued in the ordinary
courts, without the exceptional defenses which they have in Eng-
land. The United States can be sued in a limited class of cases
in the District Courts and in the Court of Claims, and in tort to
a limited extent by an administrative proceeding before the De-
partments.2 -  Probably this will be extended by pending legisla-
tion. It would be rash to infer from the mere nature of the
forum whether the individual's relief is effective or not. Ad-
ministrative courts may be as independent as ordinary courts
and are so in France, Germany and the United States. Whether
judicial control over acts of the administration is exercised by
the ordinary courts, as in Belgium, Italy, England and the
United States, or by administrative courts, as in France and Ger-
many, is also inconclusive as to the effectiveness of the remedy.
The important fact is that during the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries the range of official arbitrariness has been gradually
narrowed, and increased stress has been laid upon limiting dis-
cretion by rule and enforcing by judicial control conformity with
law. If by statute and occasional judicial construction wide
117 DIcEY, LAW OF THE CONSTrrUTION (7th ed. 1908) 395; Mor. ara,, In-
TRODUCTION to ROBINSON, PUBLIC Atr.orOrs AND LEGAL LIABILITY (1925)
lvii. Some of the misconceptions of Dicey's 6th edition are pointed out by
Parker, State and Official Liability (1905) 19 H,%v. L. RE%,. 335; and of
the 7th ed. in (1909) 3 AMER. POL. Sc. REV. 362.
See also Barker, The "Rule of Law" (1914) No. 2, Tan POLITICAL
QUARTERLY, 117.
'Li DIcE, LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (8th ed. 1915) xliv, 324, 3G4.
119 MORGAN, op. cit. svzpra note 117, at xlvii, xlx.
120 Borchard, Governmental Rcsponsibility in Tort (1924) 34 YL LAW
JOURNAL, 1, at 28.
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powers of discretion have since the war been vested in executive
and administrative officials this may be either a temporary de-
- parture, due to emergency, from the trend of the nineteenth cen-
tury, or else may evidencethe fact that the modern industrial state
by its very complexity and in the interests of efficiency is com-
pelled to vest larger discretionary powers in administrative
officers. But governmental responsibility for the wrongful acts
of officers is a doctrine growing steadily and is but one evidence
of the present popular demand for the limitation of the State
by law.
The Doctrine of Auto-Limitation. Certain German jurists,
notably Bergbohm, Jhering and Jellinek,121 postulating the dogma
that the State creates the law, were nevertheless obliged to
concede that court decisions often subjected the State to ordinary
rules of law. For example, when the State was sued in Germany
in fiscus or corporate matters, the courts, without special legisla-
tive authority, applied to the State the rules of private law.
This phenomenon of the "legal State" required explanation. The
explanation was found in the so-called doctrine of auto-limita-
tion or self-limitation of the State, according to which it
voluntarily places itself under the law it creates. Jellinek sug-
gested that the law binds the "organs" of the State, through
whom alone it can act, and that thus the State, of which the
"organs" are an integral constituent element, is necessarily also
bound. The result of State subjection to law was defended as
ethically justifiable and necessary, promotive of the best interests
of society and of confidence in the State's law. Questioned as to
how the State's coercive power to enforce law could be used
against itself, the answer was made that there are other elements
in law enforcement beside physical force, and that psychological
and cultural factors are of equal value in assuring obedience to
law. Constraint as an admitted element in positive law may be
supplied by less tangible elements than force; the guaranty of
execution, by whatever means, not merely force, is the essential
element in establishing a rule of conduct as a rule of law.
121
Against this doctrine of auto-limitation, a strong protest is
levelled by Duguit, Kelsen and other advocates of the supremacy
of law over the State or of its identification with the State.
Duguit calls the doctrine illusory and a bit of sophistry. He
says, with superficially devastating logic, that if the State is
1211 BERGEOHAI, JURISPRUDENZ U. RECHTSPHILOSOPHM (1892); Juit-
ING, DE. ZWECx I RECHT (1880) 318, 344; ibid. LAW" AS A MEANS TO AN
END (1913) 267 et seq., 314; JELLINEK, ALLGEMEINE STAATSLEHRE] (1900)
303, 330, 332.
There was a certain modification of this doctrine in Germany, according
to which the monarch, being bound only voluntarily, could set aside the
limitations. It had little practical effect, but Kelsen contests its validity.
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bound only when it so desires, how can it be deemed bound at
all? How can either individual or State impose a duty on him-
self or itself and how can such duty be enforced by him or it? 123
Austin asked similar questions. Kelsen, who regards State and
law as "in essence" theoretically and conceptually identical
phenomena,"2 challenges the legitimacy of the assumed priority
of State to law or of the supremacy of law over the State
and concludes that the doctrine of auto-limitation is metaphysi-
cal.' 2 He asserts that as the State is the law (the legal order),
it is of course subject to law and the effort to personify the
State as independent of la, and to distinguish juristic from
physical persons has led to the prevailing confusion. As the
State is the law, he denies the possibility of a State wrong or
illegality (Staatswrecht), a possibility which Jellinek freely
concedes, though he thereby is constrained to admit that the
law has in addition to variable elements, certain constant or con-
stitutional elements, which cannot legally be transgressed. 2'
The-doctrine of auto-limitation as an attempt to reconcile the
omnipotent and the legally limited State may thus be deemed
but one form of explanation for the constitutional State. While
it may be conceded that no single individual can give law to him-
self, why can not the group, the community, through appointed
agents, elect and agree to govern themselves according to a pre-
pared or traditional body of rules, which are enforced by the
group (State) against individuals and by individuals against the
group (State). We have seen this process in action since at
least the time of feudalism. If societal agencies, such as courts,
are established, to which complaints of group violation of the
established or agreed rules can be brought and from whom deci-
sions against the group based on the rules can be obtained, why
is it not proper to characterize such rules as law? Merely be-
cause the group established the rules for its own guidance, or
because the societal agent cannot enforce the rules against the
group? So-called constitutional law is less subject to declaration
by societal agents in England than in the United States, but if
predictable governmental action is an acceptable criterion of law,
why deny to constitutional law self-imposed by the group-or
wrung from a monarch, if one will-the charcter of law? Cer-
'12 2 ,TELLL.EK, op. cit. sulpra note 121, at 303-306.
123 Duguit, op. cit. supra note 26, at 124, 137.
.124 Kelsen's conception of "pure" law will be e.xplained ijfra.
'
2 Z; KELSEN, DER SOzlOLOGISCHE U. JURISTISCHE SVAATSDEGRWF (1922) §§
22, 23.
1 2 6 J L EK, op. cit. svpra note 21, at 337. On the subjection of the State
to law and legal duties, cf. SOML6, JUMSTISCHE GRT.UNDLEHrx (1917) § 94;
RIIHL, ZUR KONSTRUKTION DER RECHTSBEZIEHUNGEN ZWXSCHEX sTrL-TLCHEN
BEHORDEN (1926) §§ 4, 8, 13, 14; Borchard, op. cit. mwra note 2, at 787, n.
79.
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tainly in the United States, where the courts are continually in-
voking constitutional limitations against legislation and adminis-
trative action, it would seem strange to deny these decisions the
character of law. And even if it may theoretically seem difficult
physically to enforce some of the decisions, they are in practice
uniformly executed. Possibly there are other sanctions or
guarantees than physical force in an organized community which
supply the element of constraint so insistently demanded by the
Austinians. Most human conduct, whether of individuals or
groups, is mainly compounded of self-restraint, the essential
mark of civilization. Sanction is only one of the elements of
law; a declaration of legal relations, the rule of law, is more
important than a formal executive sanction.12T And there are
other sanctions than force. Public opinion, the normal habits
of the community as a whole, and the legally organized associa-
tion or State, exert a constant restraint over the government, the
delegated interpreter of the constitution,128 to keep it within the
bounds of the instrument. A definition of law which would
exclude constitutional law would seem to be too narrow for
practicial utility.129
International Law. If international law is entitled to be char-
acterized as law-a question of definition 13°0-it must necessarily
limit the omnipotence or sovereignty of the State. Austin was
thus more consistent than Jellinek in denying the qualification
of "law" to international law, for while both proclaim the ulti-
mate sovereignty of the State as the source of law, Austin con-
siders the law of nations as international morality only, whereas
Jellinek explains its controlling character as resting solely on
the will of the State, on auto-limitation. Inasmuch as Austin
demands of law that it be declared by a determinate sovereign,
international law by definition could not be law to him, but only
moral precepts presumably not binding on the state when found
inconvenient. The Austinians assume that rules which rest on
consent and agreement cannot be law, for only a sense of moral
obligation makes them binding-merely another way of saying
that they are not legally binding.
The fault is with the major premise. Only new international
law, derived from international legislation, rests on consent or
agreement to be bound, and even then probably only for a com-
paratively restricted period would the unwilling state be able
to deny the force of a rule generally accepted. But in the matter
127 Vinogradoff, op. cit. supra note 108, at 152.
128 MAC IVER, THE MODERN STATE (1926) 272, 278. Cf, Jenks, Recent
Theories of the State (1927) 43 LAw Q. REv. 186, at 190, who prefers to
consider the State an institution rather than an association.129 Borchard, op. cit. supra note 2, at 789.
130 Borchard, ibid. 780.
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of customary international law, which embodies the bulk of the
rules, neither consent nor agreement of states is necessary. No
state could under ordinary circumstances successfully resist the
enforcement of such a rule. Even Bodin, the first of the modern
writers on the theory of the state, while an absolutist in the
internal aspect of sovereignty, viewed external sovereignty as
subject to the law of nations. Unfortunately, many of his suc-
cessors reversed the process for, with their acknowledged con-
stitutional limitations on internal (legal) sovereignty, they ap-
pear to regard sovereignty, viewed as a symbol of the state in
international relations, as absolutely free from external re-
straint.' 31 But, when the President or Secretary of State on
the demand of foreign nations, invoking a rule of international
law, releases an alien from the military service '-2 or releases a
rum-runner seized outside the three-mile limit, and thereby in
effect overrules a statute of Congress and a supporting decision
of a municipal court, 3 3 he is acting as a societal agent of the
American people and State and is recognizing the binding char-
acter of international law in the United States and everywhere
else. When foreign nations refused to permit Russia in the
Russo-Japanese War to make food-stuffs contraband or in other
respects to violate the rights of neutrals; 1 when foreign nations
deny to the countries of Latin-America the privilege of unilater-
ally defining the term "denial of justice" 133 or by contract with
their citizens of exacting a waiver of the privilege of demand-
ing diplomatic protection136 they are invoking international law
as a rule of law superior to any contrary rule of municipal law.'3
It was not by invoking mere rules of morality that the British-
American arbitration tribunal under the treaty of 1871 in effect
'2- See chapter by BORCHARD, on "Political Theory and Intcrnational Law"
in HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORIES, RECENT Tirs (Merriam and Barnes
ed. 1924); Garner, Limitations on National Sovcrcignty in IntcrnZation l
Relations (1925) 19 AMI. POL. SCI. REV. 1; PoLrTIs, LA PROBELiME DZS
LIMITATIONS DE LA SOUVERAINETE, 6 ACADEMIE DE DR01T INTEnNATIO-AL
(1926) Introd. and c. 1.
132 Ex parte Larrucea, 249 Fed. 981 (C. D. Calif. 1917) commented on
in (1918) 28 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 83.
33 Instructions issued Nov. 10, 1922 by Secretary of the Treasury Mellon
to customs officials at New York. See New York Times, Nov. 11, 1922, p.
2, col. 8.
134 See FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1904, 727 et seq.;
ibid., 1905, 742 et seq.
133 Mr. Bayard, Sec'y of State, to Mr. Hall, Nov. 29, 1886, FORcIGN RE-
LATIO.S, 1887, 80-81. BO1CHARD, DIPLOMATIC PROTECTIO OF CITIZENS
ABROAD (1915) 847.
136 Mr. Bayard, Sec'y of State, to Mr. Buck, Minister to Peru, Feb. 15,
1888, 6 MORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 294; Borchard, op. cit.
supra note 135, at 797 and authorities there quoted and cited.
"- In an instruction by Sec'y of State Bayard to Mr. King, Minister to
Colombia, Oct. 13, 1886, it is said:
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overruled the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in
certain prize cases.13
These cases, cited only by way of illustration, evidence the
fact that no state can posit its freedom from the rules of in-
ternational law. No state so professes. The mere fact that
violations of international law occur and occasionally go unre-
dressed is no evidence that the rules violated are not law, any
more than the no less frequent violation of municipal law is
evidence of its non-legal character. International law is often
uncertain; so is municipal law. The sanctions are somewhat
different, but they are probably none the less effective and the
interpretive agencies none the less active. International courts
do not "enforce" international law; no more do municipal courts
"enforce" municipal law. But the declaratory and binding de-
cisions of international courts are observed and carried out with
a uniformity equal to that of municipal courts. The agencies
for the enforcement of international law are not necessarily
courts, but other constitutional organs, usually the executive.
The weakness of the system, which attracts a disproportionate
amount of attention, consists in the inability to compel nations
to submit their differences to a court and the physical power
of states, exercised on occasion without regard to law, to con-
stitute themselves plaintiff, judge and sheriff in their own cause.
The belief that international law is not necessarily binding on
states, purveyed by various theorists and jurists, though founded
on essential error, can only aggravate this weakness in the
system and postpone the maturity of that international legal
order for which most of them profess to be working. In fact,
not only theory but an abundant practice supports the conclusion
that international law is binding on states, quite independently
of their consent, and unless they have and desire to exert the
physical power successfully to violate the law, they cannot and
rarely seek to escape its control. Its rules constitute a distinct
limitation on sovereignty and on municipal law, whether denom-
inated morality or law. This supremacy of international law
over a professed contrary rule of municipal law is the best evi-
"It is a settled principle of international law that a sovereign cannot
be permitted to set up one of his own municipal laws as a bar to a claim
by a foreign sovereign for a wrong done to the latter's subjects." 2 Moora,
op. cit. supra note 136, at 4.
138 The Hiawatha, 2 Black, 635, MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS,
3902 (U. S. 1863); The Circassian, 2 Wall. 135, MooR, op. cit. 3911 (U. S.
1865); The Springbok, 5 Wall. 1, MOORE, op. cit. 3928 (U. S. 1867); The
Sir William Peel, 5 Wall. 517, MOORE, op. cit. 3935 (U. S. 1867); The
Volant, 5 Wall. 179, MooRE, op. cit. 3950 (U. S. 1867); The Science, 5 Wall.
178, MOORE, op. cit. 3950 (U. S. 1867). For other illustrations where muni-
cipal law was obliged to yield to international law, see Borchard, op. cit.
"ora note 135, at 340 et seq.
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dence that the State is subject to and limited by international
law as a sort of universal constitutional law, explicit or implicit
in the municipal law of every State.13
The Suprenwcy of Law. A number of jurists in recent years,
in the course of their attack on state sovereignty, have posited a
complete separation between the State and the authority of law%,
as well as the independence of law from the State. Notable
among these theorists are Duguit and Mrabbe.10 The secret of
their unusual conclusions as to the supremacy of law lies in
their peculiar view of the nature of law. To the continental
jurists, confusion in conceptions of "law" is even easier than
to the Anglo-American lawyer, for the word droft, Rccht, dc-
r eczo, diritto, combines an ethical or moral significance of "right"
or "justice" with the element of "rule". One cannot always be
sure whether the moral or the legal element of the term is under
discussion, and their frequently varying and interchangeable
emphasis adds to the confusion. Duguit regards State and law
as independent phenomena. Both are facts. The State is a
community in which certain individuals rule others by force or
persuasion, under penalty for disobedience. Law, on the other
hand, is the name for certain rules of conduct binding on men
in society regardless of their political relations. Such rules
are conditions of social life; they must be obeyed for the pre-
servation of society. Rules of conduct which promote tlds end
of "social solidarity" are alone entitled to be characterized as
rules of law. Their sanction is not organized coercion, but psy-
chological and social approval of the rules' conformity with the
tenets of social solidarity. Such consciousness of approval or
disapproval exists in every society. The rule of law, as thus
defined, is superior and anterior to political organization, the
State. It is "objective law", limiting and determining both the
positive and negative duties of the political authority. If the
State, whether through the government or its subordinate
139VERDRoss, DIE EINHEIr DES RECHTLICHEN WELTMDIES (192., c. 1;
KELSEN, DAS PROBLEM DEE SOUVERPNETAT UND DIE THEORIE DES ViiL=ir.-
RECHTS (1920) 102 et seq.
140 See DuGurr, TRArr DE DRorr CONSTITUTIONN'EL (2d ed. 192.) especially
v. 2 and 3; ibid. L'TAT, LE DROIT OBJECTIF ET LA LOI FOSITIVE (1901) ; ibId.
L'fTAT, LES GOUVERNANTS Er LES AGENTS (1903). Bonnard, La doci ,fe de
Duguit sur le Droit et l'Mtat (1926) 1 REV. INT. DE Li THioRm U DfoiT, 18;
Duguit, Objective Laz, (1920) 20 COL. L. REv. 817; (1921) 21 ibid. 17, 126,
242; Duguit, Tie C"ncept of Public Service (1923) 32 Y,=L Lw J0u.'L
425, 429 et seq. Duguit maintains that the problems of the rights of man
and the State, whether force creates law or whether law prevails over force,
consider only "subjective law" and hence they are insoluble.
For interpretations and criticisms of Duguit's theories see the articles
cited by Borchard, op. cit. supra note 2, at 763, n. 17 and J,=oN, LiS
T90RLS POLITICAS DE DUGUIT (1919); also Wilde, Te Attack or, tMe Statc
(1920) 30 INT. J. OF ETHICS, 349.
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agencies, violates any of the rules of social solidarity, it acts
"unlawfully". Law being objective, the validity of any rule,
even legislation, depends not on its origin or source but on its
end, on its legitimacy of purpose in promoting or serving social
solidarity. The rules of law, as thus defined, are superior to the
individual and to the State. Legal limitations on the State are
thus deduced, while denying both the personality and the sover-
eignty of the State. Those invested with public power are not
"organs" of a sovereign collectivity. But as both they and the
people are subject to law, necessarily the State is subject to law.
The possibility of individual rights existing anterior to society or
to the State, Duguit denies, and he condemns the German school
which posits "subjective rights" of the individual against the
State.
Krabbe also places "law" above the State and deems it in-
dependent of the State. No sovereign authority declares law,
but he denies Duguit's assertion that the State is only a fact
unrelated to law, in which the stronger control the weaker. He
rejects Duguit's criterion of law in rules promoting social soli-
darity. He regards the State as the servant of law; "the au-
thority of the State is nothing except the authority of law." "I
Power is not the essential feature of the State, but law. The
State is a legal community, governed by law.142 The State ad-
ministers distributive justice to various interests according to
this higher law. This law is determined not by objective tests,
as Duguit believes, but, according to Krabbe, from a subjective
source in the community's, or the majority's "feeling or sense of
right." Statutes may thus not be "law", if they do not reflect
this community "sense of right"; the decision of the legislature
may be modified by the unwritten law and by agencies applying
it which better reflect the community or majority "sense of
right."
Both Duguit and Krabbe thus establish independent tests and
criteria for their "rule of law", the one, objective social solidarity,
the other, "men's feeling or sense of right". The formal char-
acter of a rule declared by societal agents does not satisfy their
definition of "law"; they demand an ethical content for "law".
One can find evidence that much formal law is rejected by the
people to whom it is to be applied, like the Dred Scott decision
and the prohibition law. Whether one denies to these unenforced
141 KRABB, op. cit. supra note 35, and the valuable introduction by the
translators, Sabine and Shepard; WILLOUGHBY, op. cit. supra note 34. See
Cohen's review of Krabbe in (1923) 32 PHILOSOPHICAL REV. 97, and the
interchange between the translators and the reviewer. Ibid. 347. See
Kelsen's criticism of Krabbe in his PROBLEM DER SOUVERXNNTXT (1920)
22-31; and op. cit. supra note 125, § 30.
142 This closely resembles Kant's natural-law definition of a State, "a com-
munity of individuals governed by law."
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or unenforceable formal rules the character of "law" again de-
pends on definition. Juries acquit and occasionally determine law
against instruction from the court. Judicial and administrative
discretion produces law ad hoc which defies systematization or
analysis. Judicial interpretation makes law according to sub-
jective views of precedents, or of standards of justice or rea-
son.143 No "sovereign" or political organization "makes" such
law. Nor does "social solidarity" or the community's "sense of
right" produce it. Human beings who are placed in a position
of authority produce it, and they reflect the zorcs, the folkways,
the opinions and prejudices of time and place and person. The
criterion of "social solidarity" and community "sense of right"
is an idealization which does no harm; but the application of the
alleged standard would be personal and subjective. It affords
no basis for distinguishing "law" from other forms of social
control or for denying to legislative, judicial or administrative
rules or decisions the character of law. While the community's
sense of justice and expediency are necessarily reflected in much
of our formal law, it does not seem to serve any practical pur-
pose to apply the criteria advanced by Duguit and Krabbe.
Again we have ideal systems for the delectation of the political
theorist, but it is hard to say whether the solution of any press-
ing problem is thereby advanced. The "sovereignty of law" is
as mystical a postulate as the "sovereignty of the State."
These efforts to develop a concept of law by processes of ab-
stract reason reflect an elemental human idealism transcending
the results of actual experience. Certain value-standards are
posited which an ideal system is supposed to produce. A rule
of conduct or law is thus tested by a standard external to it-
self. The standard exists in the mind of the writer who makes
the assumption. It was in this sense that one branch of the
eighteenth century school of natural law, exemplified by Rous-
seau and Kant, formulated a standard of "right law" against
which to test and criticize rules of positive law. It cannot be
denied that idealization of conduct exercises an important in-
fluence in moulding rules of law; but it cannot be overlooked
that the construction of philosophical legal systems based upon
some theory of justice or end of law is a pure hypothesis and
crypto-idealism. "Objective law," "social solidarity," man's
"sense of right," like the "natural law" which has dominated
men's thinking and moulded legislative and judge-made la-,
are value-standards which embody an implicit dogmatism trans-
cending experience and expressing both an ideal and the quest
for and supposed need of perfection and the absolute.14
143 Cohen, Positivism and the Limits of Idealism in the Law (1927) 27
COL. L. REV. 237, 244.
144 Cf. Rottschaefer, Jurisprudence: Philosophy or Scicnce (1927) 11
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There are others who conceive of the law as the condition
precedent to the State, and of the State as a particular subordi-
nate type of legal organization.145 Some of these dispense with
force as an essential condition of law or else posit a distinction
between natural law or some other ideal system and the positive
law created by state agencies. This new school of natural law
maintains that the ideal postulated does not involve immutable
rules, as did the old school, but that it furnishes a universal
method by which positive law can be measured and criticized.
In the language of Stammler and Saleilles, it is a "natural law
with variable content," reflecting, as Charmont puts it, "the re-
lativity of natural law". 146 Others still conceive the State as a
special legal relation, in various connotations.1 47 The supposed
distinction between the State as a social phenomenon and as a
MINN. L. REV. 293, 300. DEL VECCHIO, FORMAL BASES oF LAW (1921), c. 3,
says: "The conception of absolute justice is one of the fundamental needs
of the human mind." Ibid. 14, 15. STAMMLER, THE THEORY OF JUSTICE
(1925) pt. 1. The test of just law (richtiges Recht) is that it must har-
monize all the purposes of all the individuals in a given society. This is
too indefinite and vague to permit of any useful or intelligent critique of
law. Drake, Juristic Idealism and Legal Practice (1927) 25 MICH. L. REV.
571. On the conflict between natural law and positive law, see 4 G91NY,
SCIENCE ET TECHNIQUE EN DROIT PRIVb POSITIF (1924) §§ 288 et seq.; and
supra note 35. Cf. Vinogradoff, Legal Standards and Ideals (1924) 23
MICH. L. REv. 1, at 7, who presents as moral imperatives dominating legal
idealism at various stages of the historical evolution of jurisprudence, Provi-
dence (in the ancient and early medieval world), rationalism (from the
seventeenth to the nineteenth century), and sociological conceptions (the
present era).
145 The most prominent among these are Stammler and the sociologist
Wundt. Stammler's theory will be found in his THEORIE DEF. RECHTSWIS-
SENSCHAFT (2d ed. 1923) 176, 233, 239, 265; WIRTSCHAFT UND RECHT (3rd
ed. 1914) 100 et seq.; THE THEORY OF JUSTICE (1925) (translation of LuiREI
VON DEM RICHTIGEM RECHTE). See also his article, Fundamental Ten-
dencies in Modern Jurisprudence (1922) 21 MICH. L. REV. 623. Seo
the excellent critique of Stammler's views by G6ny in the Appendix I to
STAmmLER, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra, 493. Lorimer also entertained the
belief that only just or natural law was law at all. Op. cit. suprd note 35.
Wundt's views will be found in his V6LKERPSYCHOLOGIE (1918) v. 7, 8, 9.
Criticisms of Stammler's and Wundt's hypotheses will be found in IELSEN,
op. cit. supra note 125, §§ 25, 26. See also Cohen, op. cit. supra note 143,
at 241. The school of natural law deemed the State an association of
people living under law. KANT, METAPHYSISCHE ANFANGSGRVNDE (1796)
§ 45. Resting on contract, it was thus a legal relation, which presupposed
a legal system.
146 STAmmLER, THEORY OF JUSTICE, 90, 515; see also Saleilles, Ecole histori-
que et droit naturel (1902) 1 REv. TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL, 80, 92, 97,
98;CHARMONT, LA RENAISSANCE DU DROIT NATUREL (1910) 167, transl. in
MODERN FRENCH LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (1921) 106.
147 Loening conceives the State as a force relationship limited by rules
of law, as distinct from other force relationships, parents, teacher, ship
-captain, etc. See Vinogradoff, op. cit. supra note 108, at 148.
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legal organization 1' is disputed by Binder '4 and by Kelsen, =
who posit their own theories. Binder conceives the State as a
factual group of human beings held together by certain rules
of law determining the legal relations between the group and
individuals and between individuals hiter se."' But while con-
ceiving the State as impossible without law, he does not admit
the interchangeability of these conceptions, as so many jurists
do, or their identification, as Kelsen and others do. It must be
confessed that many of the theorists are not always consistent,
as, for example, the Swiss Affolter,12 who, while positing the
superfluity of the conception of "State", and hence of the element
of force, in the conception of law, nevertheless discusses the law
"o a State". So he maintains, almost like an Austinian, that
by the internal law of the State the State itself becomes neither
legally entitled nor bound, but only the organs and the members
of the State individually or inter se.' 3 But, says Kelsen,1 3 in
agreement with others, organs, as the parts, cannot be bound
without the State, the whole, being bound, and the very word
"organ" posits the entity which it represents.
State and Law Izterdepe'czt. There are a number of
theorists who deny the validity of the proposition that the State
is above the law or that the law is above the State. They re-
gard State and law as two independent conceptions, with differ-
ing origins, and, again in contradiction to Kelsen, always in the
plane of factual existence."' Their definition of law visualizes
a rule declared or applied, if not necessarily physically enforced,
by state agents. Thus, by definition, to their conception of law
the State becomes necessary. In this they differ from the school
of natural law, from Grotius to Kant and from their modern
successors who, like Duguit and Krabbe, erect some external
value-standard as a criterion of law to which the State itself is
149 This is the so-called dual-faced (Zweicitein) theory of the Germanc,
whose principal advocate is Jellinek. LEHRE VON DEN STAATENTMB'DU:GDI:;
(1882) 262; ALLGEMEINE STAATSLEHRE (3rd ed. 1922) 168, 332 et seq.; cf.
SEmILER, DAS JURISTISCHE KRITERIUml DES STAATES (1905) 17, 19, 49.
'4b B\IDER, PHILOSOPHIE DES RECHTS (1924) 435. Cf. SOML6, JURISTISCHE
GRUNDLEHRE (1917) § 86.
IZO KELSEN, op. cit. supra note 125, §§ 18, 19.
15' BINDER, op. cit. svpra note 149, at 483 et seq. Binder distinguishe3
"State" from "State law," in contrast to Kelsen's identification of State and
law.
1 2 Affolter, Studien --um Staatsbegriff (1903) 17 ARcInV F. 6FFENTL.
RECHT, 114 et seq. On Affolter, see Sander, Alte mnd nczt Staatsrccht:;-
lehre, (1921) 2 ZTSCHR. F. 6FF=NTL. RECHT, 176 at 133 et seq; KELSqE:, op.
cit- supra note 125, § 29.
1 Affolter, op. cit. supra note 152, at 132.
r, KELS EN, op. cit. supra note 125, at 182; ef. ROHL, o@. cit. mwpza
note 126, §§ 5, S.
1 Infra at 1095.
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subject. They admit the close affinity in origin between morals,
ethics and law, and distinguish the rules of law by their declara-
tion, application or enforcement by societal agents. They deny,
however, the Austinian conception that the State is alone the
creator of law. They find the origin of law, possibly a matter
of definition, in three sources-an act of state power, in the
sense of Bodin, Hobbes and Spinoza; in a rule-producing power
of the individual living in society, in the rationalistic sense of
Grotius, Locke and Kant; and in the inter-relation of the in-
dividual with the social consciousness and spirit, in the histori-
cal sense of Hume and Savigny. Yet to the establishment of
rules of law, the State, in their view, is essential. Contrary
to the postulate of Hobbes, Austin and Holmes, however, they
assert that the State is not only the guarantor and sanction of
the law, but that, as a juristic association, the State is itself a
part of the legal order and subject to the law like any other
association or institution. Necessarily, state agents are equally
subject to law.
The leading exponent of this point of view is Richard
Schmidt.156 In conceiving the State as itself a subject of the
legal order, the theory in question espouses the doctrine of the
Rechtstaat or legal state, already considerd, and encounters the
objection of those who contest the doctrine of auto-limitation.
Variations of this doctrine are common. While denying the
natural-law postulate that the State is the product of pre-existing
law or that law is merely a product of the State, it is asserted
that the two are mutually interdependent-that, as Seidler ex-
presses it, the State is not only born with and in the law, but
can live only in the law.1'5  Evidently, constitutional law is here
included. So one will find remarks that "the State is in the
law".1" 8 As these theorists assume the postulate that the rule
of law alone is binding, they dispense with the necessity of auto-
limitation as an explanation of the State's subjection to law. In
the matter of legislation, they deem the State and all its organs
constrained to recognize it and hence bound by it until repealed,
and judge-made law similarly controlling. The fact that the
legislature could except from the application of a law the State
or State agents would, in their opinion, not militate against
the validity of these propositions, in which they are supported by
156 SCHMIODT, ALLGEMEINE STAATSLEHRE (1901) c. 3; cf. the theories
which regard law and State as two sides of the same subject-matter.
SOML6, op. cit. supra note 149, 251 et seq.; RADBRUCH, GRUNDZOGE DnR
RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE (1914) 82 et seq.; See KELSEN, op. cit. supraz, note 125
§ 32.
157 SEIDLER, DAS JURISTISCHE XKRITERIUM DES STAATES (1905) 44, 49 et scq.
158 MEYER-ANSCHJTZ, LEHRBUCH DES DEUTSCHEN STAATSRECHTS (7th cd.
1919) 13, 15, 17, 21, 25, 37. Cf. WENZEL, JURISTISCME GRUNDPROBLEME
(1920) 85, 195; KELSEN, op. cit. supra note 125, § 31.
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the long-established practice of courts in subjecting public cor-
porations, including the State, to the jurisdiction of the courts
and to legal responsibility in a great variety of corporate and,
in some instances, governmental activities.
Vinogradoff,'- 9 like Gierke,0 ° deems the question of superiority
as between State and law futile. These jurists regard State and
law as two aspects of the same thing, State as the organization
of society through an aggregate of rules called law. Both are
original and one a condition of the other, as form is to content.
Both jurists deem the State, the organized society, necessarily
subject to rules of law.' 10
Kelsen. Kelsen's identification of State and law cannot be
overlooked. His effort to segregate law as a formalistic science
is explained by the fact that the sociologists of Germany, in the
earlier part of the twentieth century, had, by a naturalistic ap-
proach, envisaged law as a social phenomenon, and a part of
the science of sociology. The methods of natural science were
applied to law, in the effort to find certain natural "laws"
which governed it. Kelsen asserted the claims of jurisprudence
to determine the.scope and function of legal science. The so-
ciologists, he said, dealt with empirical facts; the jurist must
deal with rules, not of what people actually do, but of what they
ought to do in an ideal relation.' 0  He thus separates the realm
of law (Sollen) from the realm of fact or natural existence
(Sein) founded on the Kantian theory of the a priori which ex-
erted so great an influence on German philosophers. Hence his
assumed antithesis between "is" (Sein) and "should be"(Sollca),
actuality (Wirklichkeit) and value-standards (Wer), facts
(Faktizifit,) and rules (Nornmwtizitit) and their respective dis-
ciplines. Law, says Kelsen, lies in the plane of "essence" (Sol-
len); as such, it is an original category, like quantity, quality,
being, thinking, and is incapable of definition. It is thus ex-
clusively a formalistic and logical science, like mathematics.
Kelsen's theory consists of a series of postulates and
logical deductions and is thus another contribution to the sev-
eral other systems of "pure law" or analytical jurisprudence.' :'
159 1 Vinogradoff, op. cit. svpra note 15, at 84; ibid. op. cit. mpra note 108,
at 147.
10 GnuKE, op. cit. supra note 96, at 384.
1c, Other variants may be noted. Hold-Ferneck, while considering State
and law interdependent, regards law as having logical priority. DEiM ST,,T
ALS UBERPMENSCH (1926) 59, 67.
'
6 2 Kelsen's principal works are his HAUPTPROBLEE DER STATSLEHRx
(1911); DAS PROBLEM DER SOUVERXNET.XT UND DE THEORIE DES V(MLER-
RECHTS (1920); DER SOZIOLOGISCHE i. DER JURISTISCHE STAATSBEGRIFP
(1922); ALLGEmEiNE STAATSLEHRE (1925).
163 See the discussion of Austin and of Roguin. LA RL:GLE DE DnalT (1889),
and of the works of other logicians in ToURTOm0om , PnLosopir un, THnE
DLTELoPMEIN-r OF LAw (1922) 445 et seq. Roguin's ideas are set forth in
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The "rule of law" is for Kelsen a hypothesis on the probable
conduct of state officials upon the occurrence of certain events
or of acts on the part of individuals. Yet his system professes
not to be concerned with the content of rules or conduct; this,
he says, is the business of sociology. Thus his sharp distinction
between the sociological view of the State, the phenomena of
organized life, and the juristic view. Postulating his ideal sys-
tem of "pure law" he concludes that "the State" is "the law."
The two are identical in a legal sense; only in a sociological sense,
which Kelsen regards as dissociated from law, are they otherwise.
The State is thus necessarily a "subject of law", though not under
the law; it is the law. It is binding on State organs and only
thus do we know that the State is bound.
Space considerations forbid a more exhaustive analysis of the
theories and ideology of Kelsen. He has become the founder
of a philosophical school. 4 That his work is not without great
intellectual merit is evidenced by its inclusion in the standard
German modern encyclopedia of legal treatises. As a conceptual
a priori ideal of formal logic in the relation of law and state
it deserves consideration; as a solution of the problem, it may
be regarded as another system of postulates intrinsically neither
true nor untrue. Few will admit the validity or practical value
of the postulates. As a Kantian excursion into the realm of
knowledge it has great merit; as a criticism of other theories
and ideologies it is of exceptional value; as a solution of a com-
plex issue, possibly insoluble, it presents but another ideology.
It is subject to certain obvious criticism. The distinction be-
tween positivism and idealism in the law is well-known; the
effort to make the former conform to the latter is a constant
factor in human affairs. 6G It is quite possible to recognize a
difference between rules as they are and as they ought to be
without invoking the concept of law in "essence" or Sollen; this
was one of the main objections raised by Kelsen's disciple San-
der.'66  Both sets of rules would seem to lie in the realm of
an elaborate work, LA SCIENCE JURIDIQUE PURE (1923). Stammler's is a
system of "pure law." See also PICARD, LE DROIT PUR (1910), especially bk.
9.
164 SANDER, STAAT UND RECHT (1922); VERDROSS, DIE EINHIEIT DES
RECHTLICHEN WELTBILDES (1923) c. 1; KUNZ, V6LKERRECHTSWISSENSOUAFT
UND REINE RECHTSLEHRE, (1923) 40. Darmstaedter, Die neue Lehre 'von der
Staatsgewalt (1927) 6 ZTSCHR. F. 6FFENTL. REGtHT, 405.
The pages of the ZEITSCHRIFr FOR 6FFENTLICHES RECIT, edited by Iclsen
since 1920, contain many of the writings of this "Vienna school."
165 See Cohen, op. cit. supra note 143, at 237.
166 SANDER, STAAT UND RECHT (1922) ; ibid. Rechtsdogmatik oder Theoriv
der Rechtserfahrung? Kritische Studie zur Rechtslehre Hans Kelsen&
(1921) 2 ZTSCHR. F. OFFENTL. RECHT, 511-670; Der Begriff der Rcchtscr-
fahrung, (1923) 11 LOGoS, 285 et seq.; ibid. KELSEN'S RECHTSLEHRM ICAMPF-
SCHRIFT WIDER DIE NORMATIVE JURISPRUDENZ (1923) § 2.
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existence. It appears unprofitable to regard all the social sciences
in the realm of "should be"; and positive law, as commonly under-
stood, deserves to be and can be studied with apparatus other
than that of sociology or categorical philosophy. And perhaps
Kelsen is not always consistent. Law, like State, is used in
several senses; and when he speaks of the State as a Zwags-
apparat (enforcing machine) is he not dissolving the conceptual
identity between State and law? What kind of rules are rules
without substantive content? Law is continually changing and
it is evolved pragmatically in the daily work of the courts. Does
the State also follow each change? How about conflicting rules
evolved by different courts sitting at the same time? If Kelsen's
conception is that of a static ideal system of rules, who determines
when changes in the ideal are necessary or have taken place?
Are not the conceptions of law and the State themselves socio-
logical? Can they be defined in terms of law? Many theorists
have conceived of rules of law, existing or ideal, quite indepen-
dently of the element of enforcement or application. But un-
enforced or unapplied rules make little appeal to a community in
action, and it seems preferable to consider the machinery of
government, the enforcer of law, as one aspect of the State, if
that term is desired. Unenforced law may be more nearly natural
law, yet Kelsen regards enforcement, necessary to his postulated
system, as accomplished by state organs. It may be possible to
conceive of law as a set of rules of conduct growing out of cus-
tom, as among the Eskimos or in an isolated mining ctunp,
without a politically organized society, but it seems hardly pos-
sible to conceive of a geographical or political State without law.
Before Kelsen can consider "the State" as a subject of law, must
he not conceive it as a social and political fact?
These are some of the obvious questions raised by the postu-
lates, propositions and conclusions of Kelsen. They have been
criticized on many hands U7but they deserve credit not only for
their intrinsic perspicacity as deductive logic but for the univer-
sal interest in legal and political theory which they have again
aroused.
CONCLUSIONS
This lengthy examination of conflicting views on the relation
between State and law indicates the abstruseness of the subject,
and exhibits the processes of advocacy and rationalization. We
have found that the absolute sovereignty of the State is a name
'6 See the critical work of Hold-Ferneck, op. cit. mipra note 101, directed
against the work of Kelsen; BIMDER, op. cit. supr'a note 149, at 183 ct seq.;
Heller, Die Krisis der Staatslehre (1926) 55 Ancuiv FU SozLI*,wis-
SENscuAFT, 289, at 300 et seq.
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for a postulate, but is not necessarily a fact in life. We have
found that the claim for the legally unlimited State is qualified
by the admission that no human power is unlimited, and that
while the assumed sovereignty is unlimited, the exercise of sover-
eignty is not. What does this mean in the realm of fact? Even
if we were to admit that there are no formal limitations on the
governmental power to legislate, in a State not having a writ-
ten constitution, would that help us? We may assume that the
State is one associational aspect or an institution of the community
as a whole organized under certain legal forms. We know that
this organization possesses certain functions and not others, and
that there are individual and social demands with which it would
not dare to interfere. Instead of being the source of all legal
rights, it is the trustee or delegate of certain powers designed to
preserve order in the community, to perform public services of
various kinds and to adjust conflicting interests externally mani-
fested. Its peculiarity is that it acts or purports to act in the
common interest. Perhaps it may be deemed the guarantor of the
legal rights of members of the community. It is entrusted with
the power to enforce its decisions, legislative and judicial. It re-
presents one form of corporate interest of its members, perhaps
the highest of all. Law, itself a term assigned to a variety of
conceptions, goes back to the earliest forms of society and the
law of any modern State has its sources deeply rooted in the
past. With the bulk of it, the legislature does not interfere; its
statutes are limited to passing and current matters designed to
keep in modern condition the social structure. Hence the habit
of courts, even where they have no power to set legislation aside,
of interpreting it in the light of certain value-standards reflected
in the history and mores of the community. These external
value-standards have received various names, such as Providence,
divine law, reason, a "higher law", natural law, due process of
law; and most of these terms have been differently interpreted
in different periods. They represent now an ideal or critical
standard which operates to test and mould positive law.
While all history testifies to the common conception that no
governing authority is unlimited, often manifested in the vague
axiom that the king is under the law, the social development
of the nineteenth century, following the limitations set upon
governing authority by natural law, turned attention to the
nature of sovereignty in a democratic State. The single all-
comprehensive authority of the unitary State was weakened both
in theory and fact. The complexity of social organization pointed
to limitations of power and function in all groups and in the
State, the legal organization of the community. The synthesis
of the traditional doctrine was weakened not only by the reali-
zation that there are corporations in the State, religious, econo-
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mic and ethical, which command vigorous individual allegiance
and which are uncontrolled by the State, but that there are many
functions of society into which the State does not and may not
enter. Its formal omnipotence is an illusion. Hence the study
of its limitations. The cultural tradition establishes a social con-
sciousness of limitations. Whether these social controls, which
exist in all forms of group life, are called legal, political, moral
or ethical becomes largely a terinnological and ideological issue.
If the State is a corporation, it is such by virtue of legal con-
ceptions and would seem to be controlled by those conceptions.
If it owns property, it can hardly function in a modern State
without being bound by the law governing property relations.
So, if it enters into contracts. All this vast body of controlling
law was not created by any modern State, but is a growth of
centuries. Can any modern State completely escape it, and if
it accepts it, is this entirely due to legislative fiat? Perhaps the
question admits of no categorical answer. If it is subject to
the control of constitutional law and international law.,, are we
not justified in considering those limitations legal? For practi-
cal purposes, no authority in the State is outside the domain
of law, a fact which would be true even though the authority
were vested with wide discretionary powers; some one must
make decisions in any State. To the individual, the State acts
only through organs, or agents, whose powers are determined
by law. If the community, by its authorized agents, can change
that law, we may assign to this power of decision the name of
political sovereignty, if we like, subject to all the necessai,
qualifications on "unlimited" power. But those to whom legal
power is entrusted are themselves subject to law, and it is in
this sense that the theorist and the citizen are justified in deem-
ing the organ and the State as part to whole, agent to princi-
pal, and in identifying their power and action. Government
and State are thus both legal terms as distinguished from the
community or society as a whole. The community, if one will,
is subject to social, ethical, moral, political controls; the govern-
ment and State, in addition, to controls which may properly be
termed, it is submitted, legal limitations. Language is a form
of shorthand for ideas, and our legal terminology is inadequate
because the same word is often used to clothe a variety of ideas.
The important point is, to overcome the deficiencies of our
linguistic shorthand, to recognize and define assumed postulates
and conceptions, and not to become lost in verbal and metaphy-
sical mazes. The whole course of history, with slight though
frequent interruptions, has been toward responsible government,
that is, responsible toward those for whose benefit and needs it
presumably exists. If this has gradually tended toward evolving
legal conceptions by which to judge the acts of those in authority,
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this is a reflection of modern political development. Force and
arbitrariness are thus limited by rule, rule administered by
societal agents, usually courts, judicial or administrative. This
uniformity, regularity and predictability of decision governing
the relations between the government and the governed may,
without undue demands on credulity, receive the name law;
and the term "public law" has thus found its way into universal
use. If, in property and contract relations, definite rules have
been evolved in most states for determining the relations between
the government and the governed, and if foreign countries, for
the most part, bring tort relations into the same legal orbit,
there seems no valid reason why the United States should con-
tinue to employ antiquated postulates as if they constituted
reasons in order to escape what the rest of the world regards as
both moral and legal obligations.
Nor is the exemption of the United States or of a state from
suit believed to be explainable, as Mr. Justice Holmes suggested,
by any analytical formula of superiority to law. More convincing
is the explanation that the courts in this country, ostensibly sup-
ported by certain misunderstood historical maxims and for
practical conservative reasons, concluded, after the Eleventh
Amendment, that they would require legislative consent to suit
before assuming jurisdiction over the State. On the Continent,
steeped in legal tradition and juristic conceptions of corporate-
ness, that consent was assumed. XVe adopted a rule of jurisdic-
tional immunity; they did not. Both are rules of law to which
the State is subject. The problem in Europe is pragmatic-how
far does public policy and social theory require that the State
and other public corporations shall assume responsibility for the
injuries inflicted by its agents on private individuals, a problem
which requires no metaphysical speculations into the nature of
sovereignty, of law, and of the State. Is it expecting too much
to invoke such emancipation from dogma and metaphysics for
the United States?
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